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INTRODUCTION 
or nearly as long as public law litigation1 has been a fixture of the 
political, social, economic, and jurisprudential landscape of the 
United States, some judges and interest groups have sought ways to 
scale it back. Many praise the social change that has taken root as a 
result of such efforts; whether it is the fruits of desegregation, 
marriage equality, or environmental justice litigation, public law 
litigation brought about significant social change and altered the 
social justice landscape of the United States in profound ways. At the 
same time, whether through the construction of barriers in the courts 
or legislative efforts that have sought to scale back opportunities for 
such actions, the critics of public law litigation have undertaken a 
sustained effort to weaken the ability of public law plaintiffs and their 
advocates to pursue social change through the courts. 
In recent years, however, a new form of this sort of public law 
activism has taken root, with state governments becoming central 
 
1 See infra text accompanying notes 4–9 for a discussion of the phenomenon of public 
law litigation. 
F
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figures in efforts to advance social change and, at times, rein in 
federal government power. States are prosecuting what can only be 
described as very public law litigation, yet are overcoming the most 
significant barrier imposed by the courts to such litigation: the 
requirement that a litigant has standing to sue. Whether in lawsuits to 
challenge the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, or to check 
the Executive Branch’s power to set immigration policy, states have 
commenced public law litigation, pursuing very social and political 
ends. While courts imposed the requirement of standing and erected 
other significant barriers to public law litigation, states developed a 
critical strategy for overcoming the standing requirement: that is, 
asserting not “public law” harms, but rather harms that can only be 
characterized as “private law” in nature. Thus, despite the barriers to 
public law litigation imposed by the courts in recent decades, by 
characterizing their harms as private law in nature, states can pursue 
public law ends through private law means. Moreover, by doing so, 
they have become central players in a legal discourse on the breadth 
and contours of federal authority, state power, and federalism itself, 
relying on the federal courts as an institutional setting in which to 
shape such power. 
But states are no strangers or newcomers to public law litigation. 
Courts have long recognized state standing in various contexts; 
moreover, in a landmark case from 2007, the Supreme Court said 
states should be afforded “special solicitude” in standing inquiries.2 
Whether asserting their own rights as sovereigns within a federal 
system, vindicating their own proprietary interests, or pursuing so-
called “quasi-sovereign” interests under a parens patriae theory of 
recovery to vindicate the rights of their citizens, states utilize a range 
of approaches when challenging federal power. 
This third form of action, however, the parens patriae suit, has long 
been premised on the fact that states can bring actions on behalf of 
their citizens to vindicate those citizens’ rights. In 1923, in 
Massachusetts v. Mellon, the Supreme Court found that this authority 
is limited in one critical way: states generally cannot pursue such 
actions on behalf of their constituents against the federal government 
to vindicate federal rights.3 It is the federal government, not the states, 
that enjoys parens patriae standing to protect important rights on 
 
2 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007). 
3 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485–87 (1923). 
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behalf of all citizens in the system.4 As a result, one of the barriers to 
the use of a state’s parens patriae power against the federal 
government is that states need not protect the interests of their citizens 
to assert certain federal rights. Courts have established that the proper 
way to bring a parens patriae action to preserve important federal 
rights is to have the federal government assert such rights on behalf of 
its citizens, displacing the role of the states in such settings.5 
Moreover, contemporary standing jurisprudence has become more 
skeptical of third-party standing: when the party to the lawsuit is not 
an “object” of the challenged action, but rather is seeking to bring the 
suit on behalf of another. This jurisprudence privileges those who are 
the objects of a challenged action, preferring to recognize the tangible 
and formal harms those objects suffer, like distinct and discrete 
economic injury or threats to long- and well-recognized property 
interests. When coupled with the Mellon restriction on state parens 
patriae authority to sue the federal government to vindicate federal 
rights, one would think a state’s capacity to serve as a check on 
federal authority would be limited. 
In the face of the trend toward restricting the grant of standing to 
those suffering traditional injuries and the barriers to states seeking to 
sue the federal government in their capacity as parens patriae, 
lawsuits by states against the federal government show no signs of 
disappearing. Just as states represented by conservative elected 
officials brought litigation against the Obama administration, states 
with progressive leaders are beginning to bring actions against the 
Trump administration in just the first year of its political existence. 
Yet these very public lawsuits are taking on a fairly private character, 
at least in terms of the nature of the harms those state plaintiffs are 
alleging. This private character of harms comes at a time when 
standing doctrine, as it has evolved, seems to permit lawsuits based 
on harms to private interests more than public ones, where plaintiffs 
allege more ideological, or less direct, forms of injuries. 
The apparent growth of state-initiated lawsuits with very “public 
law” components that allege traditional, common law harms, evokes a 
narrower vision of Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Consistent 
with that vision, a class of harms, those typically vindicated in private 
law contexts, are privileged in the standing analysis. Despite bringing 
 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 485–86; Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 610 
(1982). 
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sweeping public law litigation to halt actions of the federal 
government, states have faced little resistance from the courts when 
doing so. States appear to have greater success satisfying the standing 
requirement, particularly when they allege private law harms in many 
different contexts. Two reasons for this may be the following: first, 
courts developed a formalistic approach to standing that focuses 
heavily on the first prong of standing analysis—the “injury-in-fact” 
requirement; and second, in response perhaps, states pursued actions 
against the federal government emphasizing simple and direct 
economic injuries, rather than ideological ones or ones based on third-
party interests. What has resulted is the emergence of a new frontier 
and climate for state standing, one created by states for the states 
through intention or mere adaptation. 
This new climate focuses on direct harms and traditional types of 
injuries suffered by the states. These harms include injuries to 
economic interests and property rights in property owned by such 
states. This climate privileges these types of injuries over injuries to 
political interests or a desire to promote a particular vision of 
federalism and the states’ roles within the federal system. 
Paradoxically, this phenomenon has, perhaps, opened a dialogue 
about that vision after all, despite the purportedly narrow nature of the 
harms states are pursuing. Indeed, as this Article explores, recent 
litigation in health care reform, regulation of firearms, labor law, and 
immigration policy has begun to test the traditional barriers and open 
new fronts in the debate over the proper role of the states, the federal 
government, and the courts in the American federal system. 
In recent years, the evolution of standing doctrine, with its 
emphasis on traditional harms, like economic injury suffered by 
actors in a market economy, has meant that the Supreme Court’s 
entreaty—that states should enjoy “special solicitude” in standing 
analysis—is of little utility. Instead, states find more traction in the 
courts by emphasizing more traditional types of harms. As a result, 
instead of enjoying special status, especially in state-initiated lawsuits 
against the federal government, where the ability of the states to bring 
actions based on their position as parens patriae is limited, states find 
a different jurisprudential landscape. Indeed, they now find 
themselves in a position to file actions against the federal 
government, even when a traditional view of the parens patriae 
authority might restrict them from doing so. Pursuant to this new 
approach, states enjoy a status similar to that of any other litigant and 
they are doing so by describing their injuries as similar or even 
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identical to those more common, private litigants face and allege. As 
a result, instead of being hamstrung in their ability to sue the federal 
government, the doctrinal evolution in standing law has meant that 
courts need not recognize that states have a special status—nor that 
they face any particular impediment—in suits where they are 
asserting, and can assert, more traditional types of harms: the types of 
harms that the standing doctrine now embraces. Thus, while limits on 
the states’ parens patriae authority would appear to narrow a state’s 
ability to sue the federal government, the more traditional approach to 
injuries that are cognizable in the federal courts means that states are 
actually in a better position to allege such harms and establish 
standing to sue. 
More and more over the years, the standing doctrine has evolved 
and appeared as a barrier to litigation, particularly litigation to pursue 
broad claims of violations of federal rights, whether by government or 
private actors. Like other barriers the federal courts have erected in 
recent memory (like heightened pleading requirements and 
restrictions on class actions), standing doctrine has made it more 
difficult for litigants to pursue what might be considered public law 
actions. By alleging private law harms—despite the fact that they are 
pursuing very public law claims—states are finding ways to pursue 
sweeping actions. These actions are brought against broad federal 
policies that have implications for third-party interests, like those of 
their constituents, all the while alleging narrow, first-party interests. 
To explore these issues, this Article proceeds as follows. Part I 
provides an introduction to the concept of public law litigation and 
draws a distinction between it and a private law model of 
adjudication. It will briefly discuss the history of public law litigation, 
but also discuss some of the efforts to scale back such litigation 
through the imposition of both jurisprudential and statutory barriers. 
The barrier that will ultimately draw the greatest attention is the 
standing doctrine, which is the basis of the discussion for Part II, 
which provides an overview of contemporary standing jurisprudence. 
It explores its evolution and some of its roots, stressing the origins of 
the so-called “injury-in-fact” requirement and the belief that 
aggrieved individuals who are the objects of a defendant’s actions are 
recognized as having standing more readily than those who sue on 
behalf of third parties. This Part also refers to critiques of the 
contemporary approach and that approach’s resistance to so-called 
third-party standing. It identifies trends in current standing law in 
which common law and traditional private law approaches to 
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standing—typically invoked in the injury-in-fact component of the 
analysis—serve as the yardstick against which public law litigation is 
measured. 
Part III then provides an overview of situations in which state 
governments traditionally bring actions in their capacity as parens 
patriae—both in their own capacity, alleging a range of harms, and on 
behalf of their citizens. It also highlights the judicial resistance to 
actions brought by states in that parens patriae capacity when the 
federal government is the defendant and identifies those situations in 
which states have been authorized to sue federal defendants. As this 
overview will show, while there are exceptions to the bar on parens 
patriae suits by states against the federal government, prohibition has 
been the norm. 
Following this description of the parens patriae action and other 
forms of state lawsuits against the federal government, Part IV 
reviews the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Massachusetts v. 
EPA, in which the Court engaged in a lengthy discussion of state 
standing to sue, most notably dealing with the issue of a state’s power 
to sue the federal government. 
Part V then explores the implications of the Massachusetts v. EPA 
case, detailing recent trends in lawsuits brought by states, often 
against the federal government in a range of areas, including health 
law and policy, firearms regulation, labor law, and immigration 
policy. Further, Part V addresses a state-initiated challenge to the 
recent Executive Order related to travel to the United States from 
several predominantly Muslim countries. This exploration reveals that 
states are not relying exclusively on their ability to sue on behalf of 
their citizens; instead, states are alleging direct harms to traditional 
interests to secure standing to sue. And, when states have alleged 
these sorts of direct harms, the courts have often recognized such 
standing—even when an action is brought by the states against the 
federal government. Thus, states appear willing to move away from 
the traditional parens patriae suit when bringing actions against 
federal entities. Instead, states will resort to invoking harms they 
suffer in some other capacity, not necessarily as third-party 
representatives of their citizens’ interests. This trend means that states 
can utilize a private law model of litigation to advance very public 
interests and rights. 
Finally, Part VI explores the implications of this trend for future 
litigation brought by states against the federal government, where a 
private law model appears to dominate a very public law context. It 
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will also pose questions about the extent to which standing doctrine 
becomes a vehicle through which questions about federalism can play 
out. Putting aside the substance of the claims that states raise, these 
public litigants are positioning themselves as being no different from 
private litigants and alleging private law harms when doing so. At the 
same time, they are raising weighty constitutional questions, utilizing 
the narrow, typically hostile-to-public-law-litigation formalism of 
standing doctrine, all while bringing sweeping public law actions 
nonetheless. By opening the door to such litigation by privileging a 
private law model of standing, the courts have invited such public law 
litigation, but states are learning to allege private law harms when 
they take such legal action. In this way, a narrow approach to standing 
has not curtailed public law litigation nor has it limited the ability of 
the states to pursue public law claims. Rather, it has made such 
litigation more likely, as states are well-positioned to allege private 
law harms even as they pursue public law claims. What this likely 
means is that states will continue to assume a critical role in the push-
and-pull between federal and state power, ensuring an ongoing 
dialogue about the proper role of the states within the constitutional 
system, with the courts moderating that debate. Additionally, this all 
has broader implications, as states may be able to reopen the 
courthouse doors to public law litigation, even as they—at least 
nominally—seek to vindicate private law harms. 
I 
PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION: ENGINE OF SOCIAL CHANGE AND TARGET 
OF OPPOSITION 
The phenomenon known as public law litigation arose in the mid-
twentieth century as a result of a confluence of forces: the advent of 
more liberal procedural rules ushered in by the adoption of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; the expansion of private rights of 
action under federal law; and the rise of advocacy groups that would 
use the courts to promote recognition and protection of civil and 
political rights, advance environmental claims, and promote consumer 
protection.6 Unlike the much more common private law action—
which involves litigation between two private parties to resolve 
claims arising between them and which tends not to have broad 
 
6 Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 
CORNELL L. REV. 270, 272–79 (1989) (tracing the rise of public law litigation in relation 
to adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 and the expansion of private 
rights of action by Congress). 
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ramifications beyond those parties—public law litigation often 
involves complex or amorphous party structures, statutory or 
constitutional claims, and a government defendant or defendants. 
Finally, the relief awarded tends to impact individuals and institutions 
beyond just those parties who are before the court. 
Abram Chayes, who spent many years as a law professor at 
Harvard and also served as a legal advisor in the State Department, 
described the difference between a traditional view of litigation as 
being between private parties to resolve private claims, and the notion 
of what he calls the “public law model” of litigation.7 Private 
lawsuits, he argued, exhibit the following characteristics: (1) they are 
“bipolar” with respect to the litigants;8 (2) they are retrospective in 
terms of resolving past injuries; (3) the rights and remedies are 
interdependent and “derived more or less logically from the 
substantive violation” of the law;9 (4) the plaintiff will receive 
compensation “measured by the harm caused by the defendant’s 
breach of duty”;10 (5) the lawsuit represents a “self-contained 
episode,” the outcome affects only the parties;11 and, (6) litigation is 
“party-initiated” and “party-controlled.”12 This private law model is 
different from the public law model, which, Chayes argued, involves 
the following: (1) a “sprawling and amorphous” party structure,13 (2) 
the adversary relationship is “suffused and intermixed” with 
mediation throughout the conflict,14 (3) the judge is the dominant 
figure in controlling the case and draws from other entities beyond the 
parties (like special masters and experts) to assist in oversight of the 
matter,15 and (4) the judge “has increasingly become the creator and 
manager of complex forms of ongoing relief,” which affects the 
parties and others outside the litigation.16 
 
7 Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1281, 1284 (1976). 
8 Id. at 1282. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 1283. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 1284. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. Harold Hongju Koh traced Chayes’s public law model to the transnational 
context; see Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 
2347, 2347 (1991) (“Like its domestic counterpart[,] . . . transnational public law litigation 
seeks to vindicate public rights and values through judicial remedies.”). 
BRESCIA (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2018 11:51 AM 
372 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96, 363 
David Sloss’s perspective on public law litigation adopts what he 
calls a “functional approach” and is a bit narrower than Chayes’s. He 
defines such litigation as “compris[ing] litigated cases involving a 
dispute between a private party and a government actor in which the 
private party alleges that the government actor committed, or 
threatened to commit, a violation of some established legal norm.”17 
What this Article explores is a type of case that would seem to lie 
outside of Sloss’s definition: the action of a state government 
pursuing constitutional and statutory claims against the federal 
government. It is hard to argue that such litigation should exist 
outside the definition of public law litigation just because it is a public 
plaintiff lining up against a public defendant. 
Definitional disputes aside, public law litigation is responsible for 
bringing about dramatic change to political, civic, and social relations 
in the United States. From arguably the most dramatic example of this 
type of litigation, Brown v. Board of Education,18 to more recent 
instances, like cases to promote marriage equality, public law 
litigation has shaped life in the United States for generations.19 
But not everyone has seen the rise and success of public law 
litigation as an entirely positive development in law, politics, and 
jurisprudence. A confluence of interests, what Derrick Bell might call 
an “interest convergence,”20 led to a backlash against this type of 
litigation and other similar lawsuits filed against business interests. 
With the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, conservative 
government officials sought to rein in public law litigation as a means 
of protecting not just federal actors, but also state and local 
government allies, from judicial oversight,21 while representatives of 
 
17 David Sloss, Polymorphous Public Law Litigation: The Forgotten History of 
Nineteenth Century Public Law Litigation, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1757, 1768 (2014). 
18 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
19 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding state laws banning same-
sex marriage unconstitutional). 
20 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence 
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (describing shared interests between those 
advocating equal treatment for racial minorities and elites that sought to improve 
perceptions of the United States throughout the world); see also Mary L. Dudziak, 
Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 118–19 (1988) 
(supporting Bell’s analysis of the political environment in which the Brown decision was 
reached). See generally David A. Singleton, Interest Convergence and the Education of 
African-American Boys in Cincinnati: Motivating Suburban Whites to Embrace 
Interdistrict Education Reform, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 663 (2007) (advancing the use of the 
interest-convergence theory as a tool for social change). 
21 Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 
162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 1552 (2014) (describing how the first issue the Reagan 
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business interests sought a means to relieve themselves of the burdens 
of litigation.22 At the same time, some members of the judiciary, 
whether because of their political affinities or a desire for self-
preservation and to control their dockets, joined in an effort to rein in 
litigation of all types—both public and private.23 As a result, the very 
success of public law litigation, perhaps perceived by some as a 
threat, led to a change in the accessibility of courts to both private and 
public litigants. This change makes it more difficult to commence and 
sustain public law litigation through the erection of procedural 
barriers, some of them the product of congressional action, but most 
initiated through the courts. 
Indeed, in contrast to the open ethos of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (Rules) as adopted in 1938, a range of barriers now exist 
that make all litigation, public law litigation in particular, more 
difficult to advance in the courts. These barriers include, but are not 
limited to, the following: first, in decisions like Bell Atlantic v. 
Twombly24 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,25 the Supreme Court, for all intents 
and purposes, changed the pleading rules, forcing parties to allege 
their claims and defenses with sufficient specificity to raise what is 
considered a “plausible” claim for relief before commencing 
discovery.26 Second, the Supreme Court made summary judgment 
 
administration attempted to address in terms of litigation reform was limiting access to 
courts to pursue federal rights, not torts that business interests might seek to limit). 
22 In recent years, according to a compelling empirical study, litigants looking for a 
judiciary more favorable to business interests found it, at least in the Supreme Court. See 
Lee Epstein et al., How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 
1471–72 (2013) (finding more pro-business justices in Roberts Court than in previous 
eras). 
23 See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil 
Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1839, 1859–67 (2014) (describing growth of civil 
caseloads and judicial response thereto); see also Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against 
the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s 
Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1114 (2006) (describing “hostility to litigation” as a 
driving force behind procedural jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court). As Siegel found in 
his analysis of the precedents of the Rehnquist Court, “[t]he common thread throughout is 
doubt in the efficacy of a lawsuit as a mechanism for resolving the problem at hand, 
coupled perhaps with a disproportionate animosity towards those who believe otherwise.” 
Id. at 1115; see also Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 
823–40 (2011) (raising prospect that expanded access to the courts can provoke a judicial 
backlash out of concerns over increased court dockets). 
24 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
25 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
26 See, for example, Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double 
Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1 (2010), for a description of 
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more readily available by interpreting Rule 56 of the Rules in a way 
that is more favorable to those seeking adjudication without trial.27 
Third, courts are restrictive in their interpretation of fee-shifting 
statutes, lowering the incentives to litigate, particularly in civil rights 
cases where the availability of attorney’s fees to a winning plaintiff 
may offer the only chance of vindicating important rights.28 Fourth, 
courts recognized immunity to suit for state and local officials under 
the Eleventh Amendment and qualified immunity for government 
officials in many settings.29 Fifth, courts made it more difficult to 
recognize expert witnesses.30 Sixth, in cases like Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 
courts narrowly interpreted Rule 23 to raise the bar for class 
certification.31 Seventh, courts readily accepted the validity of 
arbitration clauses to keep lawsuits out of the federal courts.32 Eighth, 
courts evinced a reluctance to maintain long-standing oversight of 
institutions, like prisons and school systems, in institutional reform 
litigation.33 Finally, Congress enacted additional limitations on 
 
the Twombly and Iqbal decisions and their impact on pleading requirements in civil cases 
in the federal courts. 
27 Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” 
“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial 
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1016–73 (2003) (noting “shifting judicial attitude” 
in favor of more readily granting summary judgment). 
28 See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 
532 U.S. 598 (2001); see also Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The 
Procedural Attack on Civil Rights: The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private 
Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1087, 1133 (2007) (describing Buckhannon as part of 
an “ominous shift of power away from private enforcement of rights toward government 
power both to resist civil rights mandates and to control the enforcement of these rights”). 
29 Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 317, 322–
26 (2012) (describing the trend toward recognizing government immunity in different 
settings). 
30 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993) (setting 
standard for recognition of expert witness); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape 
of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment 
Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 551–56 (2010) (describing the impact of 
Daubert on civil rights litigation). 
31 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350–51 (2011). 
32 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). For a discussion 
of the AT&T and Wal-Mart cases, see Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on 
AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 
158 (2011); see also, Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 183 passim (2003) (describing judicially imposed limits on civil rights 
litigation brought by private litigants). 
33 See, e.g., Catherine Y. Kim, Changed Circumstances: The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the Future of Institutional Reform Litigation after Horne v. Flores, 46 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1435, 1466–68 (2013) (describing judicial endorsement of institutional 
defendants’ efforts to terminate consent decrees in public law litigation); Jason Parkin, 
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prisoner lawsuits, class actions, and antitrust actions, making each 
more difficult to pursue. Although many of the judicial decisions 
which imposed these barriers are products of the Roberts Court, the 
trend toward narrowing access to the courts started long before his 
tenure, beginning with the Supreme Court under the leadership of 
Chief Justice Burger.34 
While not all of these barriers impede public litigation and private 
litigation in the same way, the bottom line is that they all make it 
more difficult to commence and sustain public law litigation. Some of 
the cases through which the barriers described above were erected are 
“traditional” public law cases, like Iqbal, filed against the U.S. 
Attorney General and the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, among others. Many of these cases are between private 
parties, yet their holdings certainly impact public law litigants as well. 
Moreover, the animus behind some of the opinions in these cases, 
even private law cases, may have been to use them as vehicles for 
reining in public law litigation only indirectly. Many of the same 
justices who wrote the opinions in those cases were also in the dissent 
in Massachusetts v. EPA (discussed infra), which would have 
foreclosed the action on several grounds, not the least of which was 
the dissenters’ view that the lead State plaintiff failed to satisfy an 
additional barrier to litigation imposed by the courts: the requirement 
of standing. This requirement is the main subject of this Article. 
With standing doctrine, the judicial hostility to public law litigation 
is revealed in high relief. Indeed, through this doctrine, one can see a 
privileging of the private law plaintiff over the public law plaintiff 
and a judicial preference for the type of plaintiff who seeks relief 
from an injury akin to common law claims, like a threat to a property 
or contract right as opposed to a more political or nonmonetary 
interest.35 Indeed, among the barriers to public law litigation erected 
 
Aging Injunctions and the Legacy of Institutional Reform Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 
167, 187 (2017) (noting that institutional reform litigation “has lost much of the 
prominence and momentum it had during its initial phases”). 
34 See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of 
Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (1979) (describing the trend away from public law 
litigation as a “counterrevolution” in the courts); see also Siegel, supra note 23, at 1114 
(describing the Rehnquist Court’s “litigation hostility” as a “powerful force shaping the 
Court’s basal understanding of its institutional project”). 
35 Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private 
Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1386–87 (2000) 
(lamenting diminution in the ability of private plaintiffs to overcome standing 
requirements in public law litigation). 
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over the last fifty years, one of the first that the courts erected (and 
certainly one of the most effective in precluding certain plaintiffs 
from invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts) is the standing 
requirement, which the next Part explores. 
II 
CONTEMPORARY STANDING JURISPRUDENCE: FROM THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL TO THE TRIVIAL 
To understand the modern state of standing doctrine and state 
government standing in relation thereto, this Part will explore the 
development of standing doctrine, starting with a discussion of the 
contemporary state of the jurisprudence on the topic. It will then 
provide a brief overview of the history of standing doctrine as it has 
evolved to reach its current state. Because of the central importance of 
the injury-in-fact component of the standing inquiry and its 
preeminence in discussions that center around state standing, as 
subsequent discussions show, I have confined much of the discussion 
that follows to that aspect of the standing inquiry.36 
A. The Contemporary Consensus: Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife37 
The requirement that a party wishing to bring a lawsuit must have 
standing to sue has become not just axiomatic, but part of what many 
have seen as a constitutional imperative. Indeed, a plaintiff’s standing 
has been described as an “irreducible constitutional minimum” of any 
lawsuit.38 While a vast jurisprudence has emerged, most notably over 
the last fifty years, in which the standing question has been addressed, 
the state of contemporary judicial thinking on the standing doctrine 
can be traced to the now-landmark case Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife,39 a case from 1992. There, building on prior precedent, the 
Supreme Court described the standing requirement as containing three 
core elements.40 First, the plaintiff has to have suffered an “injury in 
fact,” which has been described as “an invasion of a legally protected 
interest” that is both “concrete and particularized,” and “actual or 
 
36 As the cases set forth in Part V reveal, the injury-in-fact question is central to the 
issue of state standing, and a discussion of all aspects of the standing inquiry is mostly 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
37 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
38 Id. at 560. 
39 Id. at 555. 
40 Id. at 560. 
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imminent” and not merely “conjectural” or “hypothetical.”41 Second, 
there “must be a causal connection between the injury and the 
conduct complained of”—that is, the injury has to be traceable to the 
action of the defendant and not of some third party “not before the 
court.”42 Third, it must be “likely” that the injury can be “redressed 
by a favorable decision” of the court.43 
In addition to these three essential elements of the standing 
requirement, courts also identify so-called “prudential”44 limitations 
that further narrow a litigant’s path to standing. These include that the 
litigant must “assert his own legal rights and interests,”45 and the 
Supreme Court “has refrained from adjudicating ‘abstract questions of 
wide public significance’ which amount to ‘generalized grievances,’ 
pervasively shared and most appropriately addressed in the 
representative branches.”46 Lastly, the plaintiff’s complaint must “fall 
within ‘the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute 
or constitutional guarantee in question.’”47 
While some argue that the standing requirement emanates from the 
use of the terms “cases” and “controversies” in Article III of the U.S. 
Constitution, as will be described shortly, the Supreme Court also 
indicated that the purposes of the standing requirement include 
ensuring that as disputes come before the courts they are “presented 
in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable 
of resolution through the judicial process.”48 For example, courts 
have rejected lawsuits that appear to present questions that place a 
court in the position of offering a mere “advisory opinion.”49 Such 
lawsuits are those in which the litigants seek a ruling from a court in 
light of a dispute between the parties over the meaning of a statute or 
the legality of a particular practice but the dispute is, at most, 
 
41 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)). 
42 Id. (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976)). 
43 Id. at 561 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43). 
44 Id. at 560. 
45 Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 161 n.2 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)). 
46 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 
454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (citation omitted). 
47 Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 
397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)). 
48 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). 
49 See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 598 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting one of the 
purposes of the standing doctrine is to prevent federal courts from issuing advisory 
opinions); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 352–60 (1911) (describing origins of 
the prohibition on judicial advisory opinions). 
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theoretical in nature and has not manifested itself in an actual conflict 
other than one over terms, meanings, and definitions. Some of the 
concerns in such settings include that courts might venture into waters 
more appropriately left to other branches by the Constitution50 or that 
the parties are not necessarily in an adversarial position, and, as a 
result, they may not present the arguments as zealously as they might 
had they had an actual stake in the outcome51—a concern that often 
results from being in a position to present no more than theoretical 
concerns about the consequences of challenged practices. 
Furthermore, the standing requirement “tends to assure that the 
legal questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in the 
rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual 
context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of 
judicial action.”52 It “reflects a due regard for the autonomy of those 
persons likely to be most directly affected by a judicial order,”53 and 
rejects efforts to use the federal courts to serve as “no more than a 
vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned 
bystanders”54 and as “publicly funded forums for the ventilation of 
public grievances or the refinement of jurisprudential 
understanding.”55 In this way, the “‘cases and controversies’ language 
of [Article] III” should have the effect of “foreclose[ing] the 
conversion of courts of the United States into judicial versions of 
college debating forums.”56 
By protecting the “autonomy [of parties] . . . most directly affected 
by a judicial order,”57 then, in addition to protecting the courts’ 
jurisdiction, resources, and reputation, the standing requirement also 
has a component of litigant self-determination to it—that is, the 
requirement places “the decision as to whether review will be sought 
in the hands of those who have a direct stake in the outcome.”58 The 
distinction described in the first of the prudential limitations—that 
 
50 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 678 (1988). 
51 See Sec’y of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 956 (1984) (requiring 
party before the court have a sufficient stake in the outcome and be in a position to present 
the issues with “adversarial zeal”). 
52 Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 472. 
53 Id. at 473. 
54 United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 
U.S. 669, 687 (1973). 
55 Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 473. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 (1972). 
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courts are less willing to allow litigants to press the rights of others as 
opposed to those of themselves—has an aspect of this notion of 
“standing as self-determination” to it.59 
That a litigant must assert his or her own interests, and, by 
extension, his or her own injuries, is embodied in the Lujan decision, 
an opinion by Justice Scalia, with a concurring opinion by Justice 
Kennedy.60 In Lujan, the plaintiffs were environmental groups 
challenging the Environmental Protections Agency’s (EPA) 
interpretation of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) that it should not 
be applied extraterritorially.61 The groups were asserting the rights of 
their members and alleging that the lack of extraterritorial reach of the 
ESA meant that actions abroad that the groups wanted covered by the 
Act increased “the rate of extinction of endangered and threatened 
species.”62 The Lujan Court recognized that “the desire to use or 
observe an animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes, is 
undeniably a cognizable interest for the purpose of standing.”63 The 
Court went on, however, to state that the “injury-in-fact” test required 
“more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the party 
seeking review be himself among the injured.”64 In order to do this, 
the Court stressed, the respondents would have to “submit affidavits 
or other evidence showing, through specific facts, not only that listed 
species were in fact being threatened by funded activities abroad, but 
also that one or more of respondents’ members would thereby be 
 
59 For a discussion of the role of self-determination as a justification for standing 
doctrine, see Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the “Case 
or Controversy” Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 310–15 (1979). But see Mark V. 
Tushnet, The Sociology of Article III: A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 HARV. L. 
REV. 1698, 1724 (1980) (critiquing the notion that self-determination as a justification for 
standing doctrine is sufficient to foreclose actions by a public interest litigant). 
60 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). Justice Scalia wrote the majority 
opinion, the critical portions of which, those that related to the failure of the respondents to 
have alleged sufficient injury in fact to afford them standing, was joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, Justices White, Thomas, Kennedy, and Souter. Kennedy authored a concurring 
opinion with respect to that portion of the majority opinion, in which Souter joined. Justice 
Stevens concurred in the judgment only. Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion that 
Justice O’Connor joined. Id. at 556. 
61 See id. at 585–88 (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing the issue of the extraterritorial 
reach of the ESA). 
62 Id. at 562. 
63 Id. at 562–63 (citing Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734). 
64 Id. at 563 (citing Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734–35). 
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‘directly’ affected apart from their ‘special interest’ in th[e] 
subject.”65 
The plaintiffs submitted affidavits that purported to allege injuries 
to individual members of the plaintiff-organization. Those affidavits 
stated that members of the organization visited sites where federal 
funds were being used on projects in India and Egypt that would 
affect the habitats of already endangered species.66 The Scalia 
opinion would complain, however, that, by failing to make any 
showing that the affiants had any specific plans to visit the sites of 
these projects in the future, their affidavits failed to establish any 
concrete injury to the members’ interests.67 Thus, the affidavits 
“plainly contain[ed] no facts . . . showing how damage to the species 
will produce ‘imminent’ injury to” the members.68 Indeed, the 
opinion would continue, “the affiants’ profession of an ‘inten[t]’ to 
return to the places they had visited before—where they will 
presumably, this time, be deprived of the opportunity to observe 
animals of the endangered species—is simply not enough” to 
 
65 Id. The Court also referenced the leading case to address the issue of when a group 
may assert the rights of its individual members, which put the plaintiff organization in the 
position of bringing suit on behalf of those members, assuming those individual members 
were, themselves, harmed in some way by the challenged action or inaction at the center of 
the suit. Id. (citing Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 
(1977)). 
66 See id. The Court highlighted the fact that the Court of Appeals “focused on the 
affidavits of two Defenders’ members—Joyce Kelly and Amy Skilbred.” Id. The 
allegations with respect to Ms. Kelly were that  
she traveled to Egypt in 1986 and “observed the traditional habitat of the 
endangered Nile crocodile there and intend[s] to do so again, and hope[s] to 
observe the crocodile directly,” and that she “will suffer harm in fact as the result 
of [the] American . . . role . . . in overseeing the rehabilitation of the Aswan High 
Dam on the Nile . . . and [in] develop[ing] . . . Egypt’s . . . Master Water Plan.” 
Id. (citation omitted). The allegations with respect to Ms. Skilbred were that she “traveled 
to Sri Lanka in 1981 and ‘observed th[e] habitat’ of ‘endangered species such as the Asian 
elephant and the leopard’ at what is now the site of the Mahaweli project funded by the 
Agency for International Development (AID) . . . .” Id. (citation omitted). The Court noted 
that “although she ‘was unable to see any of the endangered species;’ ‘this development 
project,’ she continued, ‘will seriously reduce endangered, threatened, and endemic 
species habitat including areas that I visited[,] . . . [which] may severely shorten the future 
of these species’ . . . .” Id. (citation omitted). According to Skilbred, that threat “harmed 
her because she ‘intend[s] to return to Sri Lanka in the future and hope[s] to be more 
fortunate in spotting at least the endangered elephant and leopard.’” Id. The Court also 
referenced the deposition of Ms. Skilbred in which she admitted that she had no current 
plans to return to Sri Lanka, but only hoped to “in the future.” Id. at 564. 
67 Id. at 563–65. 
68 Id. at 564. 
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establish standing.69 As the majority opinion found, “[s]uch ‘some 
day’ intentions—without any description of concrete plans, or indeed 
even any specification of when the some day will be—do not support 
a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury that our cases require.”70 
The majority opinion also shot down other theories on similar 
grounds, including what was called the “animal nexus” approach, 
“whereby anyone who has an interest in studying or seeing the 
endangered animals anywhere on the globe has standing; and the 
‘vocational nexus’ approach, under which anyone with a professional 
interest in such animals can sue.”71 Justice Scalia was not moved by 
either, stating as follows: 
It goes beyond the limit, however, and into pure speculation and 
fantasy, to say that anyone who observes or works with an 
endangered species, anywhere in the world, is appreciably harmed 
by a single project affecting some portion of that species with which 
he has no more specific connection.72 
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, with which Justice Souter 
joined, endorsed the majority’s view of injury in fact, even while 
recognizing that the formalist approach to injury might appear 
“trivial.”73 As Justice Kennedy wrote: 
While it may seem trivial to require that Mses. Kelly and Skilbred 
acquire airline tickets to the project sites or announce a date certain 
upon which they will return . . . this is not a case where it is 
reasonable to assume that the affiants will be using the sites on a 
 
69 Id. 
70 Id. (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
71 Id. at 566. 
72 Id. at 567. As the majority opinion would explain: 
Under these theories, anyone who goes to see Asian elephants in the Bronx Zoo, 
and anyone who is a keeper of Asian elephants in the Bronx Zoo, has standing to 
sue because the Director of the Agency for International Development (AID) did 
not consult with the Secretary regarding the AID-funded project in Sri Lanka. 
This is beyond all reason. Standing is not “an ingenious academic exercise in the 
conceivable,” but as we have said requires, at the summary judgment stage, a 
factual showing of perceptible harm. It is clear that the person who observes or 
works with a particular animal threatened by a federal decision is facing 
perceptible harm, since the very subject of his interest will no longer exist. It is 
even plausible—though it goes to the outermost limit of plausibility—to think 
that a person who observes or works with animals of a particular species in the 
very area of the world where that species is threatened by a federal decision is 
facing such harm, since some animals that might have been the subject of his 
interest will no longer exist. 
Id. at 566–67 (citations omitted). 
73 Id. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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regular basis, nor do the affiants claim to have visited the sites since 
the projects commenced.74 
Although the Massachusetts v. EPA decision, discussed in Part IV, 
established somewhat new standing doctrine for state plaintiffs, Lujan 
serves as the pivotal opinion in standing jurisprudence more 
generally, setting the course taken by the federal courts for the 
ensuing twenty-five years. As it turns out, the formalism of the injury-
in-fact analysis as it played out in the Court’s opinion, containing the 
requirement that members of the plaintiff-group have a definite plan 
to visit the allegedly affected area, is consistent with the trend in the 
doctrine as it was evolving at the time. As the following discussion 
shows, this search for private harms even in public cases actually 
predates Lujan, yet it was not inevitable. A deeper review of the 
Court’s precedents leading up to Lujan, however, reveals that 
standing doctrine evolved over nearly a century (at least), and, as 
subsequent Parts explain, seems to be evolving even more, especially 
with respect to the standing of state governments as litigants. The next 
subpart traces the historical evolution of standing doctrine, revealing 
that the Court’s Lujan decision was but one part of a far longer 
jurisprudential story. 
 
74 Id. (citation omitted). In addition, this concurrence supported the notion of so-called 
“statutory standing”: i.e., that Congress can create rights, and afford standing to sue, in 
areas not recognized by a more traditional or formal approach to the injury in fact 
requirement: 
As government programs and policies become more complex and far-reaching, 
we must be sensitive to the articulation of new rights of action that do not have 
clear analogs in our common-law tradition. Modern litigation has progressed far 
from the paradigm of Marbury suing Madison to get his commission, or Ogden 
seeking an injunction to halt Gibbons’ steamboat operations. In my view, 
Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that 
will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before, and I do not 
read the Court’s opinion to suggest a contrary view. In exercising this power, 
however, Congress must at the very least identify the injury it seeks to vindicate 
and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit. The citizen-suit 
provision of the Endangered Species Act does not meet these minimal 
requirements, because while the statute purports to confer a right on “any person 
. . . to enjoin . . . the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or 
agency . . . who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter,” it 
does not of its own force establish that there is an injury in “any person” by 
virtue of any “violation.” 
Id. at 580 (citations omitted). 
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B. Injury in Fact: Constitutional Requirement or Trivial Formality? 
In addition to Justice Kennedy’s possible unease over the fact that 
the deficiency in plaintiffs’ allegations in Lujan—that they had not 
purchased a plane ticket to visit one of the identified sites—might 
“seem trivial,”75 in a dissenting opinion by Justice Blackmun and 
joined by Justice O’Connor, this idea that the plaintiffs needed to 
have shown that they had concrete plans to visit the projects allegedly 
affected by government inaction was “an empty formality.”76 For 
Justice Blackmun, “[n]o substantial barriers prevent[ed] [the plaintiff-
group’s members] from simply purchasing plane tickets to return to 
the Aswan and Mahaweli projects.”77 Constitutional law scholar Cass 
Sunstein expressed skepticism over the Court’s narrow view of the 
injury-in-fact requirement, sharing Justice Blackmun’s 
characterization, referring to the approach as it evolved into its 
embodiment in Lujan as an example of “unnecessary formalism”78 
and an injection of “common law conceptions of harm into the 
Constitution”79 that are “a product of courts’ value-laden 
judgments.”80 
For some, the requirement that the injury-in-fact component of the 
standing inquiry incorporates common law conceptions of harm can 
be traced to the meaning of the “cases” and “controversies” language 
of Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Justice Frankfurter made this 
argument explicitly and succinctly in his concurring opinion in Joint 
Anti-Fascist Refugee Commission v. McGrath.81 There, he argued that 
the case and controversy requirement of Article III 
mean[s] that a court will not decide a question unless the nature of 
the action challenged, the kind of injury inflicted, and the 
relationship between the parties are such that judicial determination 
is consonant with what was, generally speaking, the business of the 
Colonial courts and the courts of Westminster when the 
Constitution was framed.82 
 
75 Id. at 579. 
76 Id. at 592 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
77 Id. 
78 Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and 
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 203 (1992). 
79 Id. at 167. 
80 Id. 
81 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 149–57 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
82 Id. at 150. 
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Consistent with this view of standing, only individuals who are the 
“objects” of government actions that have invaded a common law or 
statutory right are afforded standing to sue to remedy such an 
invasion. Despite some concerns among the courts and commentators 
with respect to this overly formalistic view of the injury-in-fact 
requirement, in subsequent Supreme Court opinions, even in those 
cases where plaintiffs are found to have had standing, the Court 
routinely analyzes whether the plaintiffs have alleged that they have 
suffered an individualized and particularized harm.83 
But the criticisms of the injury-in-fact component of the standing 
requirement are not the only ones lobbed against standing doctrine as 
it has evolved in the contemporary era. Writing as a law professor, 
and even before the Lujan opinion, now Judge William Fletcher 
argued as follows: 
standing is . . . formulated at a high level of generality and applied 
across the entire domain of law. In individual cases, the generality 
of the doctrine often forces us to leave unarticulated important 
considerations . . . . This consequence is obvious in the apparent 
lawlessness of many standing cases when the wildly vacillating 
results in those cases are explained in the analytic terms made 
available by current doctrine.84 
Similarly, Richard Pierce argued that “the doctrines that purport to 
govern standing disputes are sufficiently malleable to allow the 
Justices to use them as tools to further their ideological agendas.”85 
One of the most important criticisms of standing doctrine is that it 
simply has no direct support in the Constitution; thus, it is a judicial 
construct. Indeed, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Lujan opens the standing 
discussion by describing the doctrine as having evolved “over the 
years.”86 This “constitutionally irreducible minimum,” it turns out, 
appears mostly a product of jurisprudence over the last 100 years, at 
most, emerging in cases in the last 50 years. 
 
83 See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185–
89 (2000) (holding individuals who personally used area threatened by potential discharge 
from wastewater treatment facility in violation of Clean Water Act had standing to 
challenge such conduct); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Aikins, 524 U.S. 11, 13–14 (1998) 
(holding plaintiffs who suffered direct injury by not having information about donors to 
political action committee had standing to seek disclosure of such information where 
required by statute). 
84 William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223 (1988). 
85 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1758 
(1999). 
86 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
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Sunstein identified five eras of standing doctrine, and I will use 
these eras to organize my own discussion of the evolution of standing 
doctrine “over the years.” In reality, though, it is more like four eras, 
given that Sunstein finds, and this is difficult to refute, that in the first 
era, from the founding of the American republic to the 1920s, there 
does not seem to be any evidence of a standing requirement. That is, 
there is little in the way of precedent that requires that one seeking to 
invoke the powers of the courts must assert that he or she is suffering 
a direct injury as opposed to an injury to someone else, nor was there 
one in the courts of England preceding the forming of the new 
American nation. During that era, in both the state and federal courts, 
there is no evidence that individuals could not bring actions if they 
were not the victims of a particular defendant’s conduct and had not 
suffered a direct injury. Noting the regularity with which litigants in 
state courts brought actions on behalf of others, following the 
tradition of the English courts, Sunstein finds “no reason to think that 
the American practice was more restrictive than that in England.”87 
For example, on the national level, congressional support for qui 
tam actions and informer suits, and the courts’ recognition of writs 
like prohibition, which were all instances where litigants sued to 
restrain actions that did not cause direct harm to them, meant that 
federal courts ended up entertaining suits without requiring a distinct 
injury to the plaintiffs before them.88 The qui tam and informer 
actions in particular, for Sunstein, “seem to be powerful evidence 
against the claim that an injury in fact is an Article III requirement.”89 
He argues further that “[t]here is no affirmative evidence of a 
requirement of a ‘personal stake’ or an ‘injury in fact’—beyond the 
genuine requirement that some source of law confer a cause of 
action.”90 Stephen Winter described these types of actions during this 
period as follows: 
Characterized neither by the private rights model of the seven 
common law forms of action nor by the “injury-in-fact” paradigm 
of modern standing doctrine, these matters took forms astonishingly 
similar to the “standingless” public action or “private attorney 
general” model that modern standing law is designed to thwart.91 
 
87 Sunstein, supra note 78, at 173. 
88 Id. at 173–77. 
89 Id. at 177. 
90 Id. at 178. 
91 Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 
40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1396 (1988). 
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Following this early period in the nation’s history, doctrines that 
limited access to the courts, like standing, appear to have emerged in 
Sunstein’s second era, which begins in the wake of the Great 
Depression, in the shadow of the expansion of the federal 
government’s role in economic life through the enterprise of the New 
Deal. Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter, in their desire to insulate 
such federal intervention from suits to enjoin them, sought to draw 
some limits on the rights of litigants to challenge federal action; hence 
the emergence of standing doctrine among other similar, judicially 
constructed tools for limiting judicial review of legislative and 
administrative action.92 
Sunstein’s third period of standing doctrine’s development follows 
the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1946.93 
This statute authorizes judicial relief to anyone “suffering a legal 
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved 
by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute . . . .”94 In 
the regime ushered in by the APA, Sunstein argues, there was 
“standing for people whose common law or statutory interests were at 
stake, as well as for people expressly authorized to bring suit under 
statutes other than the APA.”95 Under this approach, “the principal 
question, for purposes of standing, was whether the law had conferred 
a cause of action. Injury in fact was neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient element.”96 
The fourth stage in the standing doctrine evolution occurs in the 
period spanning the early 1960s through the mid-1970s, and it is here 
where the injury-in-fact requirement appears to have arisen, emerging 
in the opinion Association of Data Processing Service Organizations 
v. Camp.97 There, a group of data processing service agencies 
challenged a ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency that banks 
could enter into the field of data processing and infringe on the 
 
92 Sunstein, supra note 78, at 179–80. For examples of the Frankfurter and Brandeis 
jurisprudence on some of these issues, see Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 
341 U.S. 123, 154–55 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley 
Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341–45 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). On the intellectual origins 
of the concept of “judicial self-restraint,” see Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of 
Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CAL. L. REV. 519 (2012). 
93 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2012). 
94 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). 
95 Sunstein, supra note 78, at 182. 
96 Id. 
97 See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
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plaintiffs’ market.98 There too, in an opinion by Justice Douglas, the 
Court found that “[g]eneralizations about standing to sue are largely 
worthless as such,”99 yet identified what it saw as the constitutional 
source of the standing doctrine, that is, the cases and controversies 
requirement of Article III of the Constitution. Thus, the Court found 
that it could make at least one generalization about standing: i.e., that 
“the question of standing in the federal courts is to be considered in 
the framework of Article III which restricts judicial power to ‘cases’ 
and ‘controversies.’”100 Quoting Flast v. Cohen, the Court concluded 
that “[i]n terms of Article III limitations on federal court jurisdiction, 
the question of standing is related only to whether the dispute sought 
to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a 
form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution.”101 
Douglas’s opinion embraces the notion that the standing doctrine 
emanates from the Article III pronouncement that the “judicial 
power” extends to cases and controversies “historically viewed” as 
appropriate for resolution in the courts. These are those situations 
described in the Constitution, like “cases, in Law and Equity, arising 
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority,” and 
“Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party.”102 But 
this is not the only purpose that has been articulated for the standing 
doctrine. 
In addition to the cases and controversies argument, as Judge 
Fletcher explained, “[t]he stated purposes and black-letter doctrine of 
standing” include ensuring that the courts adjudicate disputes between 
litigants that are “truly adverse.”103 This means they are “likely to 
present the case effectively,” making sure those “most directly 
concerned” with a dispute “are able to litigate the questions at 
issue.”104 This helps to make the court aware of “the consequences of 
its decisions” and “prevent[s] the anti-majoritarian federal judiciary 
 
98 Id. at 151–53. 
99 Id. at 151. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 151–52 (alteration in original) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S 83, 101 
(1968)). 
102 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
103 Fletcher, supra note 84, at 222 (citations omitted). 
104 Id. (footnote omitted). 
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from usurping the policy-making functions of the popularly elected 
branches.”105 
In Data Processing, the Court held that the plaintiffs were 
aggrieved by agency action because their economic interests were 
affected by the Comptroller’s decision to allow banks to compete in 
their market.106 For the Court, this was a cognizable injury for the 
purposes of the standing inquiry, satisfying the “first question” for 
standing purposes: “whether the plaintiff alleges that the challenged 
action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise.”107 
The plaintiffs in Data Processing alleged that government action 
harmed their economic interests directly, as opposed to merely 
permitting a competitor to get away with something, which might 
have enabled a court to see this as a “competitor lawsuit,” the type 
that the Court had rejected in the past.108 In Data Processing, the 
Court distinguished a prior decision, Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. 
TVA, which held that a party did not have standing “unless the right 
invaded is a legal right,—one of property, one arising out of contract, 
one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute 
which confers a privilege.”109 Recognizing that such an analysis 
“goes to the merits,” the Court in Data Processing declared that the 
determination of whether a party has standing “is different.”110 Such 
an analysis, “apart from the ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ test,” asks 
“whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is 
arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by 
the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.”111 And the interest 
in question, “may reflect ‘aesthetic, conservational, and recreational’ 
as well as economic values.”112 The Court explicitly referenced what 
it called “noneconomic values” in order to “emphasize that standing 
may stem from them as well as from the economic injury on which 
petitioners rely here,” noting that “[c]ertainly he who is ‘likely to be 
 
105 Id. (citations omitted). 
106 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153–56. 
107 Id. at 152. 
108 See, e.g., Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 136–40 
(1939) (rejecting competitor suit against entry of government-authorized actor into market 
for generation and sale of electricity). 
109 Id. at 137–38. 
110 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 154 (citations omitted). 
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financially’ injured, may be a reliable private attorney general to 
litigate the issues of the public interest in the present case.”113 
Despite the apparently expansive view of the types of injuries a 
court might recognize as satisfying the injury-in-fact component of 
the standing inquiry, the fact remains that the Court did inject this 
requirement into that inquiry. Yet, as Sunstein asks, “[w]hat was the 
source of the injury-in-fact test?” and “[d]id the Supreme Court just 
make it up?”114 His answer: “[B]asically yes.”115 He traces the 
sources of the injury-in-fact test to an administrative law treatise by 
Kenneth Culp Davis,116 where the author interpreted the meaning of 
the APA’s “adversely affected or aggrieved” language, claiming that 
anyone who is adversely affected is one who has suffered an injury 
“‘in fact.’”117 
But it is here where we see an apparent liberalization of standing 
doctrine. At this point in its evolution, the doctrine would appear to 
move beyond common law principles, as seen in the Court’s 
departure from the Tennessee Valley view of standing. There, 
standing was limited to those who have suffered common law 
injuries. At the same time, even though the doctrine evolves, it still 
deploys a similar, formalistic view of injury by relying on a litigant’s 
ability to identify some injury in fact.118 Indeed, even while 
recognizing a shift in the law during the time frame in which the Data 
Processing decision was issued, and despite the notion that the injury-
in-fact requirement finds little early support in the case law before 
Data Processing, just three years after reaching that decision, the 
Court pronounced its fealty to the notion that a plaintiff may assert 
only an injury to him or herself.119 Noting that “the law of standing 
has been greatly changed in the last 10 years,” the Court noted that it 
has “steadfastly adhered to the requirement that, at least in the 
absence of a statute expressly conferring standing,” plaintiffs in the 
federal courts “must allege some threatened or actual injury resulting 
 
113 Id. (citation omitted). 
114 Sunstein, supra note 78, at 185. 
115 Id. For the argument that standing’s requirements are rooted in long-standing 
constitutional jurisprudence, see Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat 
Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 691 (2004). 
116 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (1958). 
117 Sunstein, supra note 78, at 186 (citing DAVIS, supra note 116, § 22.02, at 211–13). 
118 Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152–56 (1970). 
119 Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973). 
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from the putatively illegal action before a federal court may assume 
jurisdiction.”120 
Such a view would appear to run counter to the ethos of the New 
Deal and the post-New Deal eras, with their expansion of the federal 
government’s role in protecting rights and carrying out important 
governmental functions. It draws an unnecessary distinction between 
interests (common law on the one hand and statutory on the other) 
precisely at a time when Congress and the executive branch were 
seeking to expand interests to protect both common law rights and 
new claims based on statutorily created interests alone. Indeed, even 
in a case that appeared to recognize the possibility of statutorily 
created rights, the endorsement of the injury-in-fact standard and all it 
has come to represent appears as a departure from the New Deal 
expansion of rights and interests, the very protection of which, 
ironically, was to serve as the impetus for standing doctrine. The 
distinction between objects of legislation and beneficiaries of it, and 
the expansive view of who had standing to sue, would be undermined 
by the continuing reliance on more formalistic views of the injury-in-
fact requirement.121 
In order for the courts to act in accordance with the new, expansive 
view of the federal government’s role in protecting rights, a restrictive 
approach toward access to the courts had to be replaced by one that 
recognized new interests and those interests should have “receive[d] 
no less protection than the interests traditionally protected by the 
common law.”122 Such an effort would make no distinctions between 
the objects of legislation and those who were supposed to benefit 
from it. It was supposed to have served as a rejection of a private law 
model of standing and an embrace of a public law model; one that 
 
120 Id. 
121 As Sunstein explains: 
[W]e might understand the grant of standing to regulatory beneficiaries as a 
broad judicial effort to adapt administrative law to the principles and aspirations 
of the modem state. The New Deal reformation of the American legal system 
would ultimately make it impossible and indeed hubristic for courts to say that 
the “objects” of regulation, equipped with common law interests, would receive 
greater protection than the beneficiaries, equipped with statutory interests. The 
New Deal had itself been a wholesale attack on the idea that common law 
interests deserved special constitutional status. Under the New Deal view, the 
common law was a regulatory system that should be evaluated pragmatically, in 
terms of whether it served human liberty and welfare. When it failed to do so, the 
system had to be supplemented or replaced. 
Sunstein, supra note 78, at 187 (footnote omitted). 
122 Id. 
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looked beyond traditional common law interests, vindicated those 
rights protected by the modern state, expanded the sphere of 
interests—and individuals—to be protected, and strengthened the 
ability of the courts to serve as a platform for the protection of such 
interests and individuals. 
In his dissent in Flast v. Cohen, Justice Harlan recognized this 
distinction between private and public litigants, yet noted the long-
recognized practice of the courts to entertain causes of action brought 
by representative parties (whom he calls “non-Hohfeldian 
plaintiffs”),123 and not just those who were able to show some 
discrete and individualized injury.124 The dissent stressed that “the 
rights and interests of taxpayers who contest the constitutionality of 
public expenditures are markedly different from those of ‘Hohfeldian’ 
plaintiffs, including those taxpayer-plaintiffs who challenge the 
validity of their own tax liabilities.”125 Such litigants are 
“indistinguishable from any group selected at random from among the 
general population, taxpayers and nontaxpayers alike.”126 At the same 
time, however, “suits brought by non-Hohfeldian plaintiffs” are not 
“excluded by the ‘case or controversy’ clause of Article III of the 
Constitution from the jurisdiction of the federal courts.”127 As Harlan 
would argue, “[t]his and other federal courts have repeatedly held that 
individual litigants, acting as private attorneys-general, may have 
standing as ‘representatives of the public interest.’”128 
Justice Harlan was referring to the entreaty of Louis Jaffe, that 
courts are not limited to entertaining suits by just those pressing their 
own direct legal interests. As Jaffe would write, “[t]here is nothing in 
our experience or in our understanding of human nature which shows 
that [non-Hohfeldian] plaintiffs will not be effective advocates.”129 
He would add that “[c]itizen participation” through, among other 
 
123 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied 
in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 20–25 (1913–1914) (recognizing rights as 
emerging from relations between parties). 
124 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 116 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
125 Id. at 119 (footnote omitted). 
126 Id. at 119–20. 
127 Id. at 120. 
128 Id. (citations omitted). 
129 Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or 
Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1043 (1968). 
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things, the bringing of litigation “is not simply a vehicle for minority 
protection, but a creative element in government and lawmaking.”130 
As Sunstein argues, any resistance to move beyond the recognition 
of just common law interests represents a “private law model of 
standing,” which is “the idea that standing should be reserved 
principally to people with common law interests and denied to people 
without such interests.”131 It represents a “Lochner-like conception of 
public law,” which “defines modern public law by reference to 
common law principles that appear nowhere in the Constitution.”132 
For Sunstein, “[w]hether an injury is cognizable, however, should not 
depend on its familiarity or its common law pedigree . . . .”133 To do 
so would “represent a conspicuous reintroduction of Lochner-era 
notions of substantive due process.”134 Instead, “[w]hether an injury 
is cognizable should depend on what the legislature has said, 
explicitly or implicitly, or on the definitions of injury provided in the 
various relevant sources of positive law.”135 
The fifth stage of standing doctrine is best represented by the 
Court’s decision in Lujan, already discussed. Whereas the fourth 
stage had “witnessed a fundamental assault on the distinction between 
regulated objects and regulatory beneficiaries[,] . . . the Supreme 
 
130 Id. at 1045; see also Tushnet, supra note 59, at 1713 (arguing that “ideological 
plaintiffs, who usually have a reasonably adequate commitment to continuing efforts, will 
do a better job of representing absentees than will Hohfeldian litigants”). 
131 Sunstein, supra note 78, at 187. 
132 Id. (referencing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)). Sunstein continues: 
The private law model of standing is based on understandings that are not only 
without constitutional foundation, but that seemed to be foreclosed by democratic 
judgments following the New Deal. Indeed, that model seemed to draw upon the 
discredited view that common law and laissez-faire principles are part of the 
Constitution, to be deployed by unelected judges as the vehicle for the definition 
of a system of public law sharply opposed to modem regulatory institutions. 
 We can go even further. After the New Deal, the very distinction between 
regulatory beneficiaries and regulatory objects seemed based on a conceptual 
mistake. That distinction treated the common law as the normal and natural state 
of affairs; it saw a deviation from the common law as an intrusion on some 
“object,” and as a protection of some “beneficiary.” Indeed, the definition of the 
“object” and the “beneficiary” was parasitic on common law. But this was a way 
for courts to load the dice. Indeed, this understanding was no longer consistent 
with the practices and values of modern government. 
Id. at 187–88. 
133 Id. at 191. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
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Court has unmistakably if usually implicitly insisted on that very 
distinction.”136 
This distinction in the jurisprudence between cases brought on 
behalf of individuals who are asserting their own rights, and those 
advanced by individuals on behalf of third parties, is articulated in 
scholarship on the subject, most notably an influential article written 
by Antonin Scalia, then a circuit court judge.137 In it, Scalia argued as 
follows, 
[T]he law of standing roughly restricts courts to their traditional 
undemocratic role of protecting individuals and minorities against 
impositions of the majority, and excludes them from the even more 
undemocratic role of prescribing how the other two branches should 
function in order to serve the interest of the majority itself. Thus, 
when an individual who is the very object of a law’s requirement or 
prohibition seeks to challenge it, he always has standing. That is the 
classic case of the law bearing down upon the individual himself, 
and the court will not pause to inquire whether the grievance is a 
“generalized” one.138 
Scalia would contrast this “classic form of court challenge” with 
what he called the “increasingly frequent administrative law cases in 
which the plaintiff is complaining of an agency’s unlawful failure to 
impose a requirement or prohibition upon someone else.”139 He 
would characterize this failure as depriving the plaintiff “as a citizen, 
of governmental acts which the Constitution and laws require.”140 
This harm, Scalia would assert, “is, so to speak, a majoritarian 
one.”141 Although the plaintiff “may care more about it,” he or she 
“may be a more ardent proponent of constitutional regularity or of the 
necessity of governmental act that has been wrongfully omitted.”142 
Such an interest does not establish that the plaintiff “has been harmed 
distinctively—only that he assesses the harm as more grave, which is 
a fair subject for democratic debate in which he may persuade the rest 
of us.”143 
 
136 Id. at 195. 
137 Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation 
of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983). 
138 Id. at 894. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
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The distinction between private harms vindicated by private 
litigants, and more general injuries—ones that would not serve as the 
basis of a suit by someone in the general public—is apparent in 
Scalia’s writing—appearing to have made its way into the Lujan 
decision and the standing doctrine more generally. But, as the 
following discussion shows, there is one class of litigant who is very 
public, often pursues very public harms, and has done so for over a 
century: state governments. Indeed, as Ann Woolhandler and Michael 
Collins argued, “[i]n some sense . . . it is possible to view the state as 
an early prototype of the modern public law plaintiff.”144 In the next 
Part, I explore the role of states as plaintiffs and the ways in which the 
courts have viewed their standing in suits to vindicate a range of 
rights—both those that may be characterized as private or proprietary 
rights and those that are more public in nature. 
III 
STATE STANDING, THE PARENS PATRIAE LAWSUIT, AND PUBLIC 
INJURIES 
States are litigants in their own rights in many contexts. They bring 
criminal actions in their own courts for violation of their own laws. 
They enforce civil protections found in state and federal law against 
private actors. On rare occasions, they bring actions against other 
states, invoking the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction established 
in Article III of the U.S. Constitution.145 In many of these instances, 
the states are vindicating either their interests as parties in a market 
economy, just like any other landowner, business, or enterprise, or 
what are considered their sovereign interests within the American 
federal system. The states do this to ensure their laws are faithfully 
executed and to preserve the power over their geographic limits, both 
in terms of their jurisdictional authority as well as their natural assets. 
In the former context, those interests are generally referred to as 
propriety interests. In the latter instances, states are exercising their 
rights within a larger, federal system. In both instances, they are 
protecting “first-party” interests—their own interests as institutions—
whether political, economic, or both. At the same time, courts often 
recognize a state’s “quasi-sovereign” interest in protecting the rights 
 
144 Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 464 
(1995). 
145 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
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of the citizens of that state. In this way, a state may pursue such 
interests in a third-party capacity, in a parens patriae action. 
Although states had sued each other by invoking the Supreme 
Court’s original jurisdiction for centuries, this third-party approach—
parens patriae meaning “parent of the country”146—was first 
recognized by the Supreme Court in 1900.147 In the case Louisiana v. 
Texas, the state of Louisiana brought an action against Texas to 
protect commerce coming from the port of New Orleans that was 
subject to a quarantine in Texas, which harmed the interests of 
businesses that moved products through that port.148 Although the 
Court rejected the suit because Louisiana failed to properly invoke the 
original jurisdiction of the Court in actions between states, the Court 
recognized the right, for the first time, of a state to sue in a third-
party/parens patraie capacity on behalf of its citizens.149 The Court 
explained that the case was not “an action by a private person.”150 
Rather, Louisiana had presented “herself in the attitude of parens 
patriae, trustee, guardian or representative of all her citizens.”151 
Indeed, Louisiana was not asserting its own rights, over its own 
property or interests, the Court would find, but, instead “the matters 
complained of affect[ed] her citizens at large.”152 As a result, the 
Court would not entertain the suit as one between states, which would 
have warranted the exercise of the Court’s original jurisdiction. 
Despite rejecting the suit, the Court did not necessarily reject the 
notion that the state could bring an action generally, not invoking that 
original jurisdiction, in a third-party capacity.153 The problem for 
Louisiana was that the Court could not entertain the suit sitting in its 
limited capacity as a court of first—and last—resort, finding “in order 
that a controversy between States, justiciable in this court, can be held 
to exist, something more must be put forward than that the citizens of 
one State are injured by the maladministration of the laws of 
another.”154 
 
146 Parens Patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979). 
147 See Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900). 
148 Id. 
149 See id. at 19. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 22–23. 
154 Id. at 22. 
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This recognition of a state’s authority to vindicate the rights of its 
citizens through the parens patriae authority can be traced to the 
English common law, which recognized a right held by the King to 
represent those who might be perceived as not being able to represent 
themselves.155 These functions were ultimately assumed by the states 
after the formation of the United States. The authority has shifted to 
reach beyond the power to simply stand in for those less able to 
represent themselves and has been extended to the authority to 
represent all of a state’s citizens.156 
Several years after Louisiana, the Court again made a distinction 
between cases in which a state could invoke the original jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court and those in which it could not, but expanded 
the contours of the parens patriae authority by recognizing a “quasi-
sovereign” interest in protecting the environment of a state. In 
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., the Court noted that the case had 
been “argued largely as if it were one between two private parties,” 
although it was not a case of that nature.157 Indeed, as the Court 
found, “[t]he very elements that would be relied upon in a suit 
between fellow-citizens as a ground for equitable relief are wanting 
here.”158 The State owned “very little of the territory alleged to be 
affected, and the damage to it capable of estimate in money, possibly, 
at least, is small.”159 Instead, the case was one in which the State was 
suing over an “injury to it in its capacity of quasi-sovereign” and “[i]n 
that capacity the state has an interest independent of and behind the 
titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. It has 
the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their 
forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.”160 
This apparent reticence to blend parens patriae—admittedly third-
party standing—with the Court’s original jurisdiction seems to 
evaporate completely by the late 1940s. During this time, the Court 
 
155 See Hawai’i v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972) (describing 
tradition of the parens patriae power deriving from the English common law where the 
king had the “power as guardian of persons under legal disabilities to act for themselves”). 
156 See, e.g., Michael Malina & Michael D. Blechman, Parens Patriae Suits for Treble 
Damages Under the Antitrust Laws, 65 NW. L. REV. 193, 197 (1970–1971) (describing 
origins of the parens patriae power); Comment, State Standing to Challenge Federal 
Administrative Action: A Re-Examination of the Parens Patriae Doctrine, 125 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1069, 1078–79 (1977) (same). 
157 Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907). 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
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elided the state’s capacity to sue in its own right, invoking the original 
jurisdiction of the Court, with its capacity to sue to prevent harms on 
behalf of its citizens.161 In Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., the 
Court found that Georgia “as a representative of the public” was 
complaining about a wrong, which, it was alleged, “limits the 
opportunities of her people, shackles her industries, retards her 
development, and relegates her to an inferior economic position 
among her sister States.”162 Because of this, the Court found that 
these were “matters of grave public concern in which Georgia has an 
interest apart from that of particular individuals who may be 
affected.”163 That interest, the Court would go on to say, was “not 
remote,” it was “immediate.”164 If the Court were to deny Georgia “as 
parens patriae the right to invoke the original jurisdiction of the Court 
in a matter of that gravity, we would whittle the concept of 
justiciability down to the statute of minor or conventional 
controversies.”165 The Court concluded that there was “no warrant for 
such a restriction.”166 
Just as the Court vacillated between whether or not it should 
recognize a state’s ability to bring an action before the Supreme Court 
sitting as a court of original jurisdiction when it was asserting third-
party standing or first-party standing, it also appears to have placed 
less emphasis on requiring that states allege harms to their own, direct 
interests (as landowners and direct participants in the economy), as 
opposed to invoking more general harms, such as harms to the 
environment.167 That is, in these cases, invoking both parens patriae 
standing and the right to pursue claims before the Supreme Court 
sitting in its original jurisdiction, states stressed—and the Court 
recognized—harms that can be characterized as violations of public 
rights as opposed to those that threatened mere private and proprietary 
interests. Indeed, in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., while 
recognizing that the state of Georgia suffered direct harm to its 
proprietary interests, this harm was of much less importance to the 
Court: “The alleged damage to the state as a private owner is merely a 
 
161 See supra text accompanying notes 145–55. 
162 Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 451 (1945). 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. (emphasis added). 
166 Id. 
167 Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907). 
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makeweight, and we may lay on one side the dispute as to whether the 
destruction of forests has led to the gullying of its roads.”168 
This “makeweight” language appears elsewhere as well, indicating 
the Court did not feel such private law allegations were necessary 
when a case of clear public law import was before it. Indeed, in 
Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., the Court recognized that the 
State, in its proprietary capacity, would face injury by the 
anticompetitive behavior of the defendants because it was “the owner 
of a railroad and as the owner and operator of various public 
institutions” within the State.169 But such injuries were far less 
important to the Court given what can only be described as the public 
law nature of the lawsuit; the Court described the important place of 
its original jurisdiction in the constitutional scheme and the nature of 
the harm at stake in the action as follows: 
as in [Georgia v. Tennessee Copper], we treat the injury to the State 
as proprietor merely as a “makeweight.” The original jurisdiction of 
this Court is one of the mighty instruments which the framers of the 
Constitution provided so that adequate machinery might be 
available for the peaceful settlement of disputes between States and 
between a State and citizens of another State. Trade barriers, 
recriminations, intense commercial rivalries had plagued the 
colonies. The traditional methods available to a sovereign for the 
settlement of such disputes were diplomacy and war. Suit in this 
Court was provided as an alternative.170 
More recently, in a case not invoking the Supreme Court’s original 
jurisdiction, the Court had a chance to describe the scope of a state’s 
parens patriae authority. In Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico brought an action against Virginia-
based apple growers for discriminating against Puerto Rican seasonal 
workers in favor of foreign workers.171 The Court articulated three 
types of harms that a state could typically allege: first, harm to 
proprietary interests, like the right to payment on a debt, to collect 
tolls, or damage to property held by the state.172 Second, harm to its 
 
168 Id. 
169 Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. at 447. 
170 Id. at 450 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
171 Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S.592, 597–600 (1982). 
172 See, e.g., Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. at 447–52 (recognizing right of state to bring 
parens patriae action to challenge harms to quasi-sovereign interests in the health and 
welfare of the general economy and citizens of the state and noting that harms to state in 
its proprietary interest, though present and cognizable, were a mere “makeweight”) 
(citation omitted). But cf. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 262–66 (1972) 
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“sovereign interests,” which, the Court explained, were “easily 
identified.”173 These include “the exercise of sovereign power over 
individuals and entities within the relevant jurisdiction, [which] 
involves the power to create and enforce a legal code, both civil and 
criminal . . . .”174 Finally, the third type of harm includes “the demand 
for recognition from other sovereigns—most frequently this involves 
the maintenance and recognition of borders.”175 
The apple growers challenged the Commonwealth’s standing to 
bring an action on parens patriae grounds. They alleged that this suit 
involved quasi-sovereign interests: those not considered proprietary 
or sovereign. That would lead the Court to identify a third type of 
harm to a state right or interest: the “quasi-sovereign” interest.176 
After reviewing instances in which courts recognized state standing to 
assert such quasi-sovereign interests, the Court’s majority opinion 
summarized these holdings, expressing its understanding that the 
contours of the parens patriae power to assert such quasi-sovereign 
interests are expressed in precedents, if not easily or succinctly 
described.177 In order to bring such an action, “the State must 
articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private 
parties, i.e., the State must be more than a nominal party. The State 
must express a quasi-sovereign interest.”178 These interests fall into 
“two general categories”: a quasi-sovereign interest “in the health and 
well-being—both physical and economic—of its residents in general” 
and “a quasi-sovereign interest in not being discriminatorily denied its 
rightful status within the federal system.”179 
In assessing the harms Puerto Rico alleged on behalf of its citizens, 
the Court noted that the defendants argued that just a small number of 
jobs—787—were at stake. Nevertheless, the Court thought this 
characterization of the harm Puerto Rico was trying to vindicate was 
too narrow: that what was really at issue was the fact that the 
commonwealth’s pursuit of its citizens’ interests went beyond the 
mere “economic and commercial.”180 The Court recognized a “state 
 
(holding state of Hawai’i could only sue to vindicate its own proprietary interests in an 
antitrust action). 
173 Alfred, 458 U.S. at 601. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 601–10 (discussing quasi-sovereign interests). 
177 Id. 
178 Id. at 607. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. at 609. 
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interest in securing residents from the harmful effects of 
discrimination.”181 Indeed, noting the Court’s “experience with the 
political, social, and moral damage of discrimination,” it could not 
fail to “recognize that a State has a substantial interest in assuring its 
residents that it will act to protect them from these evils.”182 Thus, 
even though fewer than 800 Puerto Rican workers were directly 
impacted by the policies of the Virginia apple growers involved in the 
lawsuit, the commonwealth’s interest in protecting its workers against 
the “political, social, and moral” effects of discrimination, in addition 
to its economic consequences, was sufficient to give it parens patriae 
standing in the action.183 
Despite the broad grant to states to pursue parens patriae actions, it 
is not without limitation. The most important limitation for this 
discussion is that states may not bring such actions against the federal 
government to vindicate the federal rights of their citizens. In such 
cases, the power is much more circumscribed. The leading case on 
this issue is the Court’s opinion in the consolidated cases 
Commonwealth v. Mellon and Frothingham v. Mellon, where the 
Court rejected a suit by the state of Massachusetts and a resident 
thereof to annul a statutory program designed to promote childhood 
and maternal health by spending federal tax dollars and enlisting 
states in the administration of the program.184 The challengers—the 
state, suing in its parens patriae capacity and invoking the original 
jurisdiction of the Court, and a taxpayer—sought to enjoin the 
administration of the program under the theory that it constituted an 
inappropriate encroachment on state authority to address the health 
and wellbeing of its citizens.185 With respect to the parens patriae 
power of the states, the Court found that it did not extend to actions 
against the federal government to enforce federal rights.186 “[T]he 
citizens of Massachusetts are also citizens of the United States,” the 
Court found.187 Thus, “a State, as parens patriae,” may not “institute 
judicial proceedings to protect citizens of the United States from the 
operation of the statutes thereof.”188 States have no “duty or power to 
 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 609–10. 
184 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 478–80 (1923). 
185 Id. For a description of the Frothingham case, see JAMES Q. WILSON, 
BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 279 (1989). 
186 Mellon, 262 U.S. at 485–86. 
187 Id. at 485 (emphasis added). 
188 Id. 
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enforce their rights in respect of their relations with the Federal 
Government.”189 Instead, “[i]n that field it is the United States, and 
not the state, which represents them as parens patriae, when such 
representation becomes appropriate; and to the former, and not to the 
latter, they must look for such protective measures as flow from that 
status.”190 
Beyond the mere issue of the scope of the states’ parens patriae 
power, the Court also laid the groundwork for the standing doctrine 
more broadly, beyond cases in which states serve as plaintiffs. The 
Court required that in order to invoke judicial intervention, at least in 
actions to challenge the constitutionality of a federal statute, a 
plaintiff must establish what can only be described as a distinct injury 
by virtue of the action challenged. The party seeking relief from the 
courts must be able to show not just that the statute challenged was 
unconstitutional but also that the plaintiff had “sustained or is 
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury” flowing from 
that violation “and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way 
in common with people generally.”191 
The bar against states suing the federal government under their 
parens patriae authority is not complete, however, as courts have 
permitted states to bring suits in several settings. The most prevalent 
setting, which largely exposes many of the functions of the modern 
federal government—sprawling, bureaucratic, corporatized—to suit 
by state actors, is that courts have recognized the ability of states to 
bring parens patriae actions against federal agencies for violation of 
federal law. Representative of this type of action is Abrams v. 
Heckler.192 There, New York State’s Attorney General and its 
Insurance Commissioner brought a declaratory judgment action on 
behalf of the state of New York in its parens patriae capacity to 
declare that the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) exceeded her statutory authority when she 
promulgated a rule that would have increased auto insurance 
premiums for Medicare recipients in New York State. That rule 
would no longer permit insurance carriers under state law to allow 
such recipients to have Medicare pay for injuries sustained in auto 
accidents before the insurer became liable to pay for them. The 
plaintiffs alleged that the HHS rule was contrary to the federal statute 
 
189 Id. at 486. 
190 Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
191 Id. at 488. 
192 Abrams v. Heckler, 582 F. Supp. 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
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governing the interplay between medical insurance and auto 
insurance.193 They also alleged that the State was harmed directly and 
in its own capacity because the rule would make it more difficult for 
State officials to carry out their responsibilities. The rule, it was 
alleged, “interfere[d] with [the plaintiffs’] ability to discharge their 
obligation to protect the interests of New York’s elderly and disabled 
car owners.”194 The Abrams court ultimately found New York state 
officials could sue both as representatives of the state as parens 
patriae and for the direct harm to the state officials because the HHS 
rule would make their ability to carry out their official obligations 
more difficult.195 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit found that the Washington Utilities and 
Transportation Commission (WUTC), a Washington state agency 
charged with overseeing rates for telecommunications providers and 
companies from other sectors, could bring an action against the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC). There, WUTC claimed 
that an FCC order would adversely impact telecommunications rates 
for consumers and make it more difficult for the WUTC to protect 
consumer interests.196 The FCC’s order, it was alleged, contravened 
Congress’s will because it violated both the Communications Act of 
1934197 and the National Environmental Policy Act.198 As in Abrams, 
the court of appeals found both that the state agency had standing in 
its own right, to remedy its own injury, and that the agency could sue 
the federal government on behalf of the people of the state of 
Washington, invoking the parens patriae power.199 There, with 
respect to the state agency’s own interest, the court found that the 
plaintiff satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement of Data Processing 
“because the alleged interference with WUTC’s ability to discharge 
its obligation to protect the interests of Washington telephone users 
gives specificity and concreteness to the controversy and assures its 
presentation with adversarial vigor.”200 Furthermore, in terms of the 
agency’s ability to bring the action under the state’s parens patriae 
authority, the court found that “[a] substantial portion of 
 
193 Id. at 1157. 
194 Id. at 1161. 
195 Id. at 1161–62. 
196 Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm’n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142, 1146–47 (9th Cir. 1975). 
197 47 U.S.C. § 214 (2012). 
198 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012). 
199 Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm’n, 513 F.2d at 1151–53. 
200 Id. at 1149. 
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Washington’s citizens would be affected by an increase in intrastate 
telephone rates . . . [and] increased rates for intrastate telephone 
service would inhibit communication vital to the economic and social 
well-being of the community as a whole.”201 For these reasons, the 
state agency was authorized to bring an action on its own behalf, and 
on behalf of the citizens of the state as parens patriae, against the 
FCC.202 
As this discussion attempts to show, courts have long recognized 
the authority of states to bring parens patriae actions alleging a range 
of harms, from what might be characterized as private ones to very 
public ones. Indeed, the Supreme Court appears to have expressed a 
preference for allegations of public harms in many state-initiated 
lawsuits, sometimes characterizing state injuries as “makeweight” 
arguments to establish what can only be described as state standing to 
sue. At the same time that courts have taken an expansive view of 
state authority to commence parens patriae actions, or even to sue in 
their own right, courts have also limited, with some exceptions, the 
power of the states to commence parens patriae actions against the 
federal government. While courts have developed some exceptions to 
the Mellon bar on states suing the federal government when asserting 
their parens patriae authority, in 2007, the Supreme Court weighed in 
on this issue quite dramatically. In that case, in the climate change 
arena, the Court appears to have expanded the instances in which 
states may sue the federal government and articulated an approach to 
the injury-in-fact requirement for state plaintiffs that possibly shifted 
the standing landscape for such public litigants. It is to that decision 
that I now turn. 
 
201 Id. at 1152. 
202 The court in WUTC found that other barriers to state actions against the federal 
government under the parens patriae authority were not present. As the opinion explains: 
The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is not invoked, and the availability 
of a remedy need not be restricted by the necessity of husbanding that court’s 
limited resources. Since no state is sued, there is no threat of circumvention of 
the Eleventh Amendment. Since no damages are sought, there is no risk of 
duplicating recoveries. Since no absent persons will be barred from a remedy 
otherwise available if this petition is entertained, the proceeding is not subject to 
criticism as a substitute for a class action without its safeguards. 
Id. at 1152–53 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). But cf. Md. People’s Counsel v. Fed. 
Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 760 F.2d 318, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., opinion) 
(holding Congress has the authority to abrogate Mellon and authorize state standing to sue 
in parens patriae capacity to vindicate the interests of their citizens, even against the 
federal government). 
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IV 
MASSACHUSETTS V. EPA 
The landmark decision in Massachusetts v. EPA has proved to be a 
watershed in not just climate change litigation and environmental 
policy, but also with respect to its holding related to state standing to 
sue the federal government. It has inspired conservative state 
governments and officials to sue the Obama administration, and now 
has empowered more progressive leaders to commence actions 
against the Trump administration.203 The decision is a bit of a 
muddle, however, particularly as it relates to some of the Court’s 
reasoning justifying its ultimate holding that the state of 
Massachusetts had standing to bring an action to direct the EPA to 
take certain regulatory steps regarding greenhouse gas emissions. In 
this Part, I will describe in detail not just the Court’s majority opinion, 
with a particular emphasis on its injury-in-fact analysis with respect to 
standing and its ruling regarding the state’s authority to sue the 
federal government, but also the dissent. The issue on which both 
camps seem to agree, despite the wide gulf that exists between them 
otherwise, is that the state of Massachusetts’s argument that it was 
suffering a harm to its proprietary injury—that is, injury to its 
interests as a landowner—would be sufficient, in theory, to satisfy the 
injury-in-fact component of the standing analysis. This Part will then 
explore some of the potential ramifications of the Court’s holding. 
A. The Majority Opinion 
1. Background 
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the state of Massachusetts, other states, 
municipalities, and nonprofit organizations all sued the EPA to 
determine whether the Clean Air Act (CAA) compelled the agency to 
take into account and assess the impact of greenhouse gas emissions 
on the environment.204 The plaintiffs in Massachusetts v. EPA asked 
the Court to “answer two questions” regarding the CAA: “whether 
EPA has statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions 
from new motor vehicles—and if so, whether its stated reasons for 
refusing to do so are consistent with the statute.”205 Under the CAA, 
 
203 See infra Part V. 
204 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 504 (2007). 
205 Id. at 505. 
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the EPA has the authority to regulate “air pollutants.”206 The 
plaintiffs sought review of the fact that the EPA had chosen not to 
make a determination as to whether greenhouse gases were air 
pollutants, despite requests by several of the plaintiffs that the EPA do 
so.207 The State plaintiffs, including the state of Massachusetts, 
asserted their right to bring the action in their capacity as parens 
patriae, but also because they were landowners affected by rising sea 
levels as a result of global warming.208 
2. Injury in Fact 
The majority opinion, by Justice Stevens, noted that the type of suit 
in question was authorized by the CAA. That is, the CAA permits a 
suit challenging the EPA’s failure to issue regulations regarding a 
particular pollutant.209 The majority opinion quoted Justice 
Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Lujan at length, which referenced 
the broad power of Congress to confer standing for harm to a 
statutory or procedural interest.210 This harm would arise because the 
EPA failed to take an administration action that the plaintiffs alleged 
the statute required them to take: 
“Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of 
causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none 
existed before. In exercising this power, however, Congress must at 
the very least identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the 
injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit.” We will not, 
therefore, “entertain citizen suits to vindicate the public’s 
nonconcrete interest in the proper administration of the laws.”211 
At the same time, the Massachusetts v. EPA majority did not 
ignore the Lujan standing elements.212 It pointed out that 
a litigant to whom Congress has “accorded a procedural right to 
protect his concrete interests”—here, the right to challenge agency 
action unlawfully withheld—“can assert that right without meeting 
all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy[.]” When 
a litigant is vested with a procedural right, that litigant has standing 
if there is some possibility that the requested relief will prompt the 
 
206 Id. at 528 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006)). 
207 Id. at 514. 
208 Id. at 518–22. 
209 Id. at 516. 
210 Id. at 516–17 (citations omitted). 
211 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. Of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580–81 
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). 
212 Id. at 517 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61). 
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injury-causing party to reconsider the decision that allegedly 
harmed the litigant.213 
Critical to the discussion of the state of Massachusetts’s standing in 
the case, the majority found that the State met the injury-in-fact 
component of the standing inquiry at least in part because it owned “a 
substantial portion of the state’s coastal property.”214 As a result, it 
had “alleged a particularized injury in its capacity as a landowner.”215 
The Court noted what it considered to be the “special position and 
interest of Massachusetts” as well as the “considerable relevance” to 
the standing discussion when a party bringing the action was a 
sovereign state.216 Because of this, such a party is entitled to “special 
solicitude” in the standing analysis.217 The majority found that, in 
suits such as the one before the Court, a state can have an 
“independent interest ‘in all the earth and air within its domain.’”218 
This can lead a plaintiff like the state of Massachusetts to have a 
“well-founded desire to preserve its sovereign territory,” and that 
desire would “support[] federal jurisdiction.”219 
At the same time, the Court went on to point out that 
Massachusetts owned “a great deal” of the coastline affected by the 
rising sea levels accompanying unregulated greenhouse gas 
emissions.220 That fact, the Court held, “only reinforces the 
conclusion that [the State’s] stake in the outcome of this case is 
sufficiently concrete to warrant the exercise of federal judicial 
power.”221 
 
213 Id. at 517–18 (citations omitted) (first quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7; then 
citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2006)). 
214 Id. at 522. 
215 Id. Although mostly beyond the scope of this Article, the Court found that the 
plaintiffs also met the causation and redressability components of the standing inquiry: a 
“reduction in domestic emissions [of greenhouse gases]” as a result of EPA action spurred 
by court intervention “would slow the pace of global emissions increases, no matter what 
happens elsewhere.” Id. at 526. For an argument that courts should relax the standing 
requirements when states sue the federal government to “protect the health, welfare, or 
natural resources of their citizens,” see Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater 
Standing Rights Than Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA’s New Standing Test for 
States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1701, 1775 (2008). 
216 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518. 
217 Id. at 520. 
218 Id. at 519 (quoting Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)). 
219 Id. (alteration in original). 
220 Id. 
221 Id. at 519. 
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The Court ultimately concluded that it was “clear that petitioners’ 
submissions as they pertain to Massachusetts have satisfied the most 
demanding standards of the adversarial process.”222 The Court did 
not, however, tease out whether it was the quasi-sovereign interests or 
the proprietary interests—individually or in combination—that gave 
rise to the finding that Massachusetts, at least, had standing. One 
could argue that that the sovereign interests alone were sufficient and 
the proprietary interests merely reinforced the fact that the State had 
standing. Nevertheless, it would appear that the Court was asserting 
that the proprietary interests might be unnecessary given the quasi-
sovereign interests. But, unlike in Tennessee Copper, where Justice 
Holmes stated that state proprietary interests were not at stake,223 the 
Court’s recognition of Massachusetts’s proprietary interests would 
seem to suggest that even if the quasi-sovereign interests were not 
enough to satisfy the standing requirement, those proprietary interests 
would be. And this would appear to be the conclusion of the 
Massachusetts dissent, which I will take up shortly. 
3. State Standing to Sue the Federal Government 
At the invitation of the dissenters, the majority opinion also 
addressed the issue of state standing to sue the federal government 
and drew some of the distinctions outlined in the case law on this 
 
222 Id. at 521. The idea that at least the state of Massachusetts suffered a concrete injury 
as a result of the violation of a statutory right likely gives rise to the Court’s use of this 
language. For a discussion of procedural harms giving rise to standing, see Zachary D. 
Sakas, Footnotes, Forests, and Fallacy: An Examination of the Circuit Split Regarding 
Standing in Procedural Injury-Based Programmatic Challenges, 13 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 
175, 176 (2006) (discussing procedural injury cases). The Supreme Court also recognized 
procedural injuries. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) (“Congress may 
grant an express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential 
standing rules.”). Even Justice Scalia’s opinion in Lujan recognizes the viability of a 
plaintiff’s standing to sue for procedural harm as long as there is still a concrete injury 
flowing from that harm: 
There is this much truth to the assertion that “procedural rights” are special: The 
person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests 
can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability 
and immediacy. Thus, under our case law, one living adjacent to the site for 
proposed construction of a federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the 
licensing agency’s failure to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement, even 
though he cannot establish with any certainty that the Statement will cause the 
license to be withheld or altered, and even though the dam will not be completed 
for many years. 
Lujan v. Defs. Of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992). 
223 Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238–40 (1907). 
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issue described above. The Court invoked its prior decision in 
Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co.,224 to highlight the difference 
between “allowing a State ‘to protect her citizens from the operation 
of federal statutes’ (which is what Mellon prohibits) and allowing a 
State to assert its rights under federal law (which it has standing to 
do).”225 The Court went on to point out that “Massachusetts does not 
here dispute that the Clean Air Act applies to its citizens; it rather 
seeks to assert its rights under the Act.”226 Although it appears that 
the Court was referring to a state suing in its parens patriae capacity, 
it also discussed whether the state was suing in a third-party role, as 
parens patriae standing is often viewed, or asserting “its rights” under 
federal law. And if it was the state’s own rights, what rights were at 
issue? Was it the quasi-sovereign rights to the land and air of the 
jurisdiction or those proprietary rights the Court also recognized? The 
Court appeared to assert that it was talking about the latter when it 
concluded the discussion of parens patriae standing against the federal 
government by citing the 1995 decision of Nebraska v. Wyoming,227 
which, in turn, cited Tennessee Copper, and permitted a state cross-
claim against the federal government to assert quasi-sovereign 
interests in the “earth and air.”228 
Based on this brief discussion of the issue of a state government’s 
right to sue the federal government under its parens patriae authority, 
buried in a footnote in the majority opinion, the Court made two 
distinctions. In identifying the first, it explained that there is a 
difference between seeking to shield citizens from the operation of 
federal law, which is what Mellon would appear to prohibit, and to 
vindicate federal statutory rights when the federal government 
violates them, which Massachusetts would appear to permit. Despite 
the first distinction that seems to point out that states can sue to 
protect against violation of federal law by the federal government (on 
whose behalf it is unclear), the second distinction sets forth that the 
rights at issue in that vindication are not those of a state’s citizens but, 
rather, the rights of the state itself. Indeed, the Court pointed out that 
the state of Massachusetts did not dispute whether the CAA applied to 
its citizens.229 Rather, the State sought to “assert its rights under the 
 
224 Georgia v. Penn. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945). 
225 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 n.17 (2007). 
226 Id. 
227 Nebraska v. Wyoming, 515 U.S. 1 (1995). 
228 Id. at 20 (citations omitted). 
229 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520 n.17. 
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Act.”230 While the Court went on to say that the interests at stake are 
the quasi-sovereign interests in earth and air, it portrayed those not in 
terms of the health of the citizens of the State but, rather, as interests 
of the State itself. Thus, the Court recognized the right of the state to 
bring an action against the federal government by asserting the state’s 
own parens patriae authority. This appears true even though it is not 
exactly clear that it is this authority that the Court relied on when it 
recognized the plaintiff-state’s standing to sue.231 The interests that 
the state of Massachusetts pursued were “its rights” as opposed to the 
rights of its citizens. But which rights were at stake: the quasi-
sovereign interests or the proprietary interests? The Court stated that 
the parens patriae power is available to the state to sue the federal 
government to pursue its own rights—not those of third persons. But 
the parens patriae authority is often portrayed as a vehicle for the 
vindication of third-party rights. By framing the interests at stake for 
determining whether a state could sue the federal government in its 
parens patriae capacity as those of the state itself, and not those of its 
citizens, the Court appears to have expanded the traditional role of the 
parens patriae authority when it allowed the state of Massachusetts to 
exercise it against the EPA under the CAA.232 
B. The Dissent 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote one of two dissenting opinions, with 
Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas joining, addressing the standing 
 
230 Id. (emphasis added). 
231 Id. at 520–22. 
232 Although it is mostly beyond the scope of this Article, the Court’s majority opinion, 
in addition to recognizing the plaintiffs’ arguments with respect to injury in fact, also 
recognized that the harms alleged were caused by the EPA’s inaction, and court 
intervention would assist in redressing the harms, even though there was a somewhat 
attenuated chain of intervening actors and events separating the harm alleged from the 
defendant and any remedy the court would devise. Nevertheless, the Court found that the 
plaintiffs satisfied the second and third components of the standing analysis. As the Court 
held, 
In sum—at least according to petitioners’ uncontested affidavits—the rise in sea 
levels associated with global warming has already harmed and will continue to 
harm Massachusetts. The risk of catastrophic harm, though remote, is 
nevertheless real. That risk would be reduced to some extent if petitioners 
received the relief they seek. We therefore hold that petitioners have standing to 
challenge EPA’s denial of their rulemaking petition. 
Id. at 526. 
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issue.233 The Chief Justice’s dissenting opinion discusses three issues 
of disagreement with the majority opinion. First, it disputes the notion 
that states, as litigants, deserve any special treatment in the standing 
analysis.234 Second, it argues against the ability of states to sue the 
federal government under a parens patriae theory.235 Third, it appears 
to accept that a state’s proprietary interests could give rise to a finding 
of a viable injury-in-fact for the purposes of the standing inquiry but 
argues that even an allegation of viable proprietary interests must be 
supported by allegations that the injury is distinct and 
particularized.236 Furthermore, looking beyond the injury-in-fact 
component of the inquiry, the Roberts dissent argued that other 
aspects of that analysis, namely causation and redressability, were 
wanting. I will describe each of these positions in turn. 
First, the Roberts dissent takes issue with the notion that states 
should enjoy “special solicitude” when it comes to standing. 
“Relaxing Article III standing requirements because asserted injuries 
are pressed by a State,” the Chief Justice argues, “has no basis in our 
jurisprudence, and support for any such ‘special solicitude’ is 
conspicuously absent from the Court’s opinion.”237 Indeed, when a 
state is suing in its parens patriae capacity, the Chief Justice states, it 
is not just that the Article III requirements are not relaxed, but, rather, 
such actions “raise an additional hurdle.”238 That is, a state seeking to 
sue as parens patriae must articulate a “‘quasi-sovereign interest,’ 
‘apart from the interests of particular private parties.’”239 For these 
dissenting justices, “[f]ocusing on Massachusetts’s interests as quasi-
sovereign makes the required showing here harder, not easier.”240 
The Chief Justice’s opinion goes on to point out that the majority 
opinion, as described above, seems to blur the difference between 
whatever quasi-sovereign interest the states may possess and press 
and those they might hold in their proprietary capacity. “The Court 
asserts that Massachusetts is entitled to ‘special solicitude’ due to its 
 
233 Id. at 535 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). A second dissenting opinion, written by Justice 
Scalia and joined by the Roberts’ opinion dissenters, addresses the merits of the plaintiffs’ 
claims and is beyond the scope of this Article. Id. at 549 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
234 Id. at 536–37 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
235 Id. at 538–40. 
236 Id. at 540–42. 
237 Id. at 536. 
238 Id. at 538. 
239 Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico ex rel. 
Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982)). 
240 Id. 
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‘quasi-sovereign interests,’” the dissent argues, “but then applies our 
Article III standing test to the asserted injury of the Commonwealth’s 
loss of coastal property.”241 Furthermore, the Chief Justice’s dissent 
refused to recognize such proprietary interests as quasi-sovereign in 
nature.242 Another way to think of the dissenters’ position, perhaps, is 
that the State, by asserting proprietary interests, is not standing in the 
shoes of someone else when asserting such interests; rather, it is, as 
the dissent points out, “likely to have the same interests as other 
similarly situated proprietors.”243 In other words, these are private, 
and not public, harms the State is asserting. The dissent further notes 
that the majority’s reliance on a state’s supposed special status is an 
“implicit concession that the petitioners cannot establish standing on 
traditional terms.”244 
The Chief Justice’s second argument is that a state cannot sue the 
federal government utilizing the parens patriae approach.245 Citing 
Mellon, the dissenting opinion asserts that, with respect to “the 
protection of [a state’s] citizens, it is no part of its duty or power to 
enforce their rights in respect of their relationship with the Federal 
government.”246 In such cases, “it is the United States, and not the 
State, which represents them.”247 
Finally, and perhaps most important for this discussion, the Chief 
Justice’s dissent appears to recognize the proprietary interests of the 
state—not the quasi-sovereign interests—as potentially giving rise to 
standing for the state of Massachusetts, but finds the particular 
allegations contained in the pleadings and supporting documentation 
submitted in the record as failing to set forth a “particularized” injury 
that is “distinct from its impact on ‘the public at large.’”248 
Just as the early history of litigation in the federal courts includes 
individuals bringing suits on behalf of others, one of the ways in 
which the dissent goes astray here is its failure to recognize that 
public entities have long brought lawsuits for actions involving the 
public at large. The primary example of this is the nuisance action. 
 
241 Id. at 539 (quoting majority opinion). 
242 Id. 
243 Id. (quoting Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601). 
244 Id. at 540. 
245 Id. at 538–40. 
246 Id. at 539. 
247 Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485–86 (1923)). 
248 Id. at 541 (citations omitted). 
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The ability to bring such actions is said to be of “ancient origin.”249 In 
a classic treatise on equity jurisprudence, early nineteenth-century 
Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story noted that the authority can be 
traced as far back as the reign of Queen Elizabeth,250 and a case from 
1535 that recognized the ability of the Crown to punish public 
nuisances.251 Courts have long acknowledged the ability of 
governmental bodies to bring nuisance actions to enjoin public—that 
is, general—nuisances.252 States are the quintessential public body, 
recognized as enjoying the power to commence cases in equity to 
enjoin public nuisances.253 Indeed, the notion that a public nuisance 
action would require a public entity to prove a private harm is 
anathema to the whole concept of the public nuisance action.254 
 
249 City of Chicago v. Festival Theatre Corp., 438 N.E.2d 159, 162 (Ill. 1982). 
250 See 2 JOSEPH STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 921–24 (1886); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“In its 
inception a public, or common, nuisance was an infringement of the rights of the Crown    
. . . . By the time of Edward III the principle had been extended to the invasion of rights of 
the public, represented by the Crown, by such things as interference with the operation of a 
public market or smoke from a lime-pit that inconvenienced a whole town.”). 
251 Y.B. MICH. 27 HEN. 8, f. 27, pl. 10 (1535), reprinted in C.H.S. FIFOOT, HISTORY 
AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW: TORT AND CONTRACT (1949): 
It seems to me that this action does not lie to the plaintiff for the stopping of the 
highway; for the King has the punishment of that, and he has his plaint in the 
Leet and there he has his redress, because it is a common nuisance to all the 
King’s lieges . . . . 
Id. For a discussion of the “anonymous” case, see Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public 
Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of the Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 790–96 
(2001); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 
90, at 646 (5th ed. 1984). 
252 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“In 
order to maintain a proceeding to enjoin to abate a public nuisance, one must . . . (b) have 
authority as a public official or public agency to represent the state or a political 
subdivision in the matter . . . .”); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 467, at 1335 
(2000) (“In the absence of a statute allowing citizens to enforce the public’s rights, those 
rights are normally enforced only by public authorities.”) (footnote omitted). 
253 See Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico ex. rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 603–05 
(1982) (listing state actions involving suits to enjoin public nuisances); see also JOSEPH A. 
JOYCE & HOWARD C. JOYCE, TREATISE ON THE LAW GOVERNING NUISANCES § 437, at 
630–31 (1906) (outlining the power of states to bring nuisance actions). 
254 DOBBS, supra note 252. As I have argued elsewhere: 
According to black letter law, when the appropriate governmental body is 
seeking relief from a public nuisance, it need not plead and prove special injury; 
rather, harm to the community is all it must show. With such public nuisance 
cases, then, the “private-law model” of standing—one that embraces the notion 
of individualized injury—is inconsistent with what courts have been doing with 
these cases for centuries. 
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Apart from this distinction between wide public harms and discrete 
and particularized injuries, the Chief Justice’s dissent scrutinizes the 
plaintiffs’ filing to conclude that “aside from a single conclusory 
statement, there is nothing in petitioners’ 43 standing declarations and 
accompanying exhibits to support an inference of actual loss of 
Massachusetts coastal land from 20th-century global sea level 
increases.”255 The dissent goes on to characterize the allegation as 
“pure conjecture.”256 But nowhere does the dissent argue that the 
alleged harm to the proprietary interests of the state of Massachusetts 
is not the type of harm that could give rise to its standing to sue the 
federal government if, in fact, the State could establish that such 
injury was discrete and particularized: that it could point to specific 
tracts of land that would be harmed by global climate change.257 
The dissent seems to argue that the problem is not with the injury 
itself—loss of land—but to the fact that the impacts of global 
warming are to “humanity at large.”258 But all of humanity does not 
own land, let alone coastal land. Indeed, the dissent goes on to say 
that “[i]f petitioners’ particularized injury is loss of coastal land, it is 
also that injury that must be ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical.’”259 In other words, the problem the dissent identifies 
with the proprietary interests at stake is not with the injury but, rather, 
whether the injury is experienced by society at large and if it is 
redressable by court intervention. With respect to this propriety 
interest, such an interest would appear to be acceptable for standing 
purposes, as an injury in fact, provided it meets the other components 
of the standing inquiry—not just that it is distinct and particularized 
but that it is caused by the defendants and redressable by the court.260 
By taking the public law element out of the case—by eliminating the 
parens patriae component of Massachusetts’s claims—as the dissent 
would do, what is left is a private harm, an assault on private interests 
that the public at large must not also experience. Thus, the State could 
 
Raymond H. Brescia, On Public Plaintiffs and Private Harms: The Standing of 
Municipalities in Climate Change, Firearms, and Financial Crisis Litigation, 24 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 7, 42 (2010). 
255 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 542 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
256 Id. 
257 Similarly, the dissent also goes on to argue that these harms do not satisfy the 
causation or redressability requirements of the traditional standing inquiry because both 
are too attenuated. See id. at 542–46. 
258 Id. at 541 (citation omitted). 
259 Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defs. Of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
260 Id. 
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proceed as a private litigant if it could show that this injury, the injury 
to the land the State owns in its proprietary capacity, satisfies the 
elements of standing. Unlike the public law arguments over quasi-
sovereign interests, the nature of the injury itself would seem to 
qualify as an injury in fact for the Chief Justice. 
C. The Ramifications of Massachusetts v. EPA 
The approach to state standing embraced by the majority in 
Massachusetts v. EPA can have, and likely is having, an impact on 
both climate change litigation and cases in which states are parties. 
Even the dissenters, who tend to espouse a private law vision of 
standing, seem to recognize that a harm to a proprietary interest—
injury to land a state owns—could serve as a viable injury in fact in 
the standing inquiry, regardless of the nature of the suit—public or 
private. As I will point out, if the record of state suits following 
Massachusetts is any indication of the effect this view of standing is 
having on public plaintiffs, such plaintiffs have come to characterize 
the injuries at stake in their lawsuits against the federal government in 
this way. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s approach to traceability and 
redressability in standing doctrine would seem to be manifestations of 
important shifts in the standing jurisprudence. It is in the Court’s 
approach to injury-in-fact, particularly as it relates to states’ ability to 
sue generally and their ability to sue the federal government in 
particular, where the opinion may have its most lasting impact. 
Because of these aspects of the Court’s holding, the decision has 
potentially broad implications for public law litigation as well as 
federal-state relations precisely at a time when states are taking 
aggressive stances in the courts opposing federal law and policy. The 
next Part explores this new frontier of state standing, even as it comes 
into focus. 
V 
STATE STANDING IN LITIGATION AFTER MASSACHUSETTS V. EPA: 
PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION THROUGH PRIVATE INJURIES 
In the wake of Massachusetts v. EPA, states have been emboldened 
to bring actions to attempt to address not just climate change but a 
host of other issues, sometimes invoking the “special solicitude” to be 
afforded the states in such actions. However, as the following 
discussion shows, often states have eschewed the traditional parens 
patriae arguments for something more akin to the private law harms 
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recognized by the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA, and that harken 
back to the narrow approach to the injury-in-fact component espoused 
by the Court in Lujan. In fact, it would appear that the more state 
litigants hew to a narrow path and articulate a harm to their own 
interests, particularly proprietary interests, they have greater success 
when pursuing major public law litigation while claiming very private 
law harms. It is to these cases that I now turn. 
A. Challenges to Federal Authority to Regulate Firearms 
While partisan actions by the states may have taken on a new sense 
of urgency for some during the presidency of Barack Obama and have 
heightened for others since the election of Donald Trump, efforts by 
states to rein in federal government authority did not begin merely as 
a response to these administrations. In the early 2000s, the state of 
Wyoming brought an action to permit it to enforce its own legislation 
in the face of a federal legislative scheme for the regulation of 
firearms.261 Federal law prohibits individuals who have been 
convicted of even a misdemeanor crime of intimate partner violence 
from owning a firearm that has been a subject of interstate 
commerce.262 The ban does not apply to convictions that have been 
expunged or set aside, however.263 Wyoming passed a statute that 
would permit an individual subject to the ban to apply for a court 
order to seal his or her conviction, which, the Wyoming legislature 
had hoped, would exempt the individual from the federal ban.264 The 
federal government’s position was that this procedure would not meet 
the criteria for an exemption from the federal ban and informed state 
authorities that it would have to conform its legislation to federal 
requirements or the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 
would require all federally licensed gun sellers in the state to conduct 
background checks of everyone in the state with a concealed carry 
permit.265 The State filed suit against the federal government for 
declaratory and injunctive relief.266 The district court found the State 
had standing but dismissed the suit, siding with the federal 
 
261 Wyoming ex rel. Crank v. United States, 539 F.3d 1236, 1240–41 (10th Cir. 2008). 
262 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(9) (2012). 
263 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) (2012). 
264 Wyoming, 539 F.3d at 1239–40. 
265 Id. at 1240. 
266 Id. at 1240–41. 
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government that the statute did not meet the requirements of the 
federal law, and the State appealed.267 
Turning to the standing issue first, the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, citing Massachusetts v. EPA, noted that states “constitute a 
special class of plaintiffs for federal jurisdiction purposes.”268 
Quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, the court of appeals found that 
“[s]tates have a legally protected sovereign interest in ‘the exercise of 
sovereign power over individuals and entities within the relevant 
jurisdiction[, which] involves the power to create and enforce a legal 
code.’”269 Thus, the harm that the State alleged it suffered at the hand 
of the federal government was a “sovereign interest” in the 
enforcement of its legal code;270 in other words, this was not a parens 
patriae action to vindicate the rights of its citizens. 
Rather, the court found that the state of Wyoming suffered a 
concrete injury in fact to its own interests, as a state, and did not need 
any form of third-party interest to satisfy the injury-in-fact test, nor 
did the court of appeals find any other aspects of the standing inquiry 
as wanting, ruling that the State could meet the traceability/causation 
and redressability requirement, while also facing no prudential 
limitations.271 Further, the court found that the State was within the 
zone of interest of the relevant statute because the federal law in 
question “grants states significant latitude to determine the 
applicability of the [Gun Control] Act by relying on state law, in part, 
to determine the classes of individuals that may not possess a 
firearm.”272 As a result, although the court ultimately rejected the 
State’s arguments on the merits, and the state statute was 
incompatible with the controlling federal law, the court found that the 
State had standing to challenge it nonetheless, alleging harms to its 
own interests rather than those of its citizens.273 
 
267 Id. at 1241. 
268 Id. 
269 Id. at 1242 (alteration in original) (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico ex 
rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982)). 
270 Id. 
271 Id. at 1242–44. 
272 Id. at 1243. 
273 Id. at 1242–43, 1249. 
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B. State Challenges to the Affordable Care Act 
After passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(ACA),274 litigants of all stripes—private individuals, employers, and 
states—all lined up to challenge the enforcement of the law.275 While 
many cases did not involve an inquiry into the standing of states to 
challenge the ACA, one case that did involve that issue was Virginia 
ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius.276 In that case, the state of Virginia 
challenged the enforcement of the Act on the grounds that one of its 
provisions, the so-called “individual mandate” which requires 
individuals otherwise not covered by health insurance to purchase 
such insurance or face a financial penalty, conflicted with a newly 
enacted state law, the Virginia Health Care Freedom Act (VHCFA) 
that purported to exempt Virginians from this requirement.277 After 
succeeding at the district court level, with a finding that the State had 
standing and the individual mandate was unconstitutional, the State 
found itself litigating in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, where 
the court rejected the State’s standing argument. Noting that the State 
failed to allege that the federal statute imposed any “obligations on 
Virginia that, in other cases, have provided a state standing to 
challenge a federal statute,”278 the court of appeals, also citing Alfred 
L. Snapp and Co. as the Tenth Circuit had, described the State’s 
standing argument as follows: 
 
274 Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010). 
275 The U.S. Department of Justice has maintained a list of the dozens of cases that 
have been filed challenging the ACA. See Defending the Affordable Care Act, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE ARCHIVES, https://www.justice.gov/archives/healthcare (last visited Feb. 28, 
2017). Representative litigation includes the following: King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 
(2015); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); U.S. House of 
Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Johnson v. U.S. Office 
of Personnel Mgmt., 783 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2015); Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014), reh’g en banc granted, vacated, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17099 (D.C. Cir. 
2014), appeal dismissed, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 16286 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
276 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011). 
277 Id. at 266–67. The state of Florida and many other states also joined an action 
challenging the constitutionality of the ACA, but, because the court found nonstate 
plaintiffs had standing, the issue of state standing was not adjudicated. Florida v. United 
States Dep’t of HHS, 648 F.3d 1235, 1243–44 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part and rev’d in 
part, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (without reaching the 
issue of state standing). 
278 Sebelius, 656 F.3d at 268. The court found that the individual mandate did not 
“directly burden Virginia,” did not “commandeer Virginia’s enforcement officials,” and 
did not “threaten Virginia’s sovereign territory.” Id. (citations omitted). 
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What Virginia maintains is that it has standing to challenge the 
individual mandate solely because of the asserted conflict between 
that federal statute and the VHCFA. A state possesses an interest in 
its “exercise of sovereign power over individuals and entities within 
the relevant jurisdiction,” which “involves the power to create and 
enforce a legal code.” A federal statute that hinders a state’s 
exercise of this sovereign power to “create and enforce a legal 
code” at least arguably inflicts an injury sufficient to provide a state 
standing to challenge the federal statute.279 
For the court, however, the Virginia statute at issue was really a 
“smokescreen” for an assault on the constitutionality of the statute on 
behalf of the citizens of Virginia, and such an assault would run afoul 
of the prohibition on suits seeking to vindicate such citizens’ interests 
against the federal government.280 Citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 
the Fourth Circuit found that the State’s action was really one to 
shield its citizens from the application of federal law.281 The court 
found that states have no role in doing so, as the authority to protect 
citizens as parens patriae rests with the federal government: “When a 
state brings a suit seeking to protect individuals from a federal statute, 
it usurps this sovereign prerogative of the federal government and 
threatens the ‘general supremacy of federal law.’”282 For the court, 
Virginia’s approach to standing would open the floodgates of states 
resisting federal government action: “[I]f we were to adopt Virginia’s 
standing theory, each state could become a roving constitutional 
watchdog of sorts; no issue, no matter how generalized or 
quintessentially political, would fall beyond a state’s power to litigate 
in federal court.”283 The court ultimately found the State’s standing 
argument unavailing, mostly because it failed to allege a cognizable 
stake in the litigation—it had failed to allege a viable injury in fact to 
its own interests.284 The court found that the “presence of the 
VHCFA neither lessens the threat to federalism posed by this sort of 
 
279 Id. (citations omitted). 
280 Id. at 269. The court described the “question presented” as follows: 
whether the purported conflict between the individual mandate and the VHCFA 
actually inflicts a sovereign injury on Virginia. If it does, then Virginia may well 
possess standing to challenge the individual mandate. But if the VHCFA serves 
merely as a smokescreen for Virginia’s attempted vindication of its citizens’ 
interests, then settled precedent bars this action. 
Id. 
281 Id. at 269–72. 
282 Id. at 269 (citation omitted). 
283 Id. at 272. 
284 Id. at 270–71. 
BRESCIA (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2018 11:51 AM 
2018] On Objects and Sovereigns: The Emerging Frontiers of State Standing 419 
lawsuit nor provides Virginia any countervailing interest in asserting 
the rights of its citizens.”285 It criticized the State for, in a sense, 
manufacturing the lawsuit.286 “[T]he action of a state legislature,” it 
held “cannot render an improper state parens patriae lawsuit less 
invasive of federal sovereignty . . . Nor does a state acquire some 
special stake in the relationship between its citizens and the federal 
government merely by memorializing its litigation position in a 
statute.”287 
At this point, it is useful to compare state litigation that was 
successful in establishing state standing to Virginia’s failure to 
establish standing to sue in order to challenge the ACA because it was 
unable to articulate a harm to its own interests. In a case that did not 
proceed past the district court level in substance, Oklahoma ex rel. 
Pruitt v. Burwell, the state of Oklahoma alleged that in its position as 
an employer it would be subject to a penalty for not offering all of its 
employees insurance in accordance with the ACA employer mandate 
and would incur costs associated with complying with the law.288 In 
this case, the court found that Oklahoma had alleged facts sufficient 
to establish an injury in fact for the purposes of the standing 
inquiry.289 There was no talk of parens patriae standing or the state 
standing in the shoes of its citizens, however. Rather, it was harm to 
the proprietary interests of the state, as an employer, that gave rise to 
its standing.290 Unlike the arguably quasi-sovereign allegations in 
Virginia in that State’s challenge to the ACA, Oklahoma’s proprietary 
injuries were entirely consistent with the private law litigation model, 
even where such actions involved very public law litigation, as 
Oklahoma did.291 
C. Challenges to Obama Administration’s Overtime Rules 
Late in President Obama’s second term, new U.S. Department of 
Labor (DOL) regulations were set to take effect that would raise the 
 
285 Id. at 271. 
286 Id. at 272. 
287 Id. at 271 (citations omitted). 
288 Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt v. Burwell, 51 F.Supp.3d 1080, 1086–87 (E.D. Okla. 2014). 
289 Id. at 1084–85. 
290 Id. at 1086. 
291 See Indiana v. IRS, 38 F.Supp.3d 1003, 1009–10 (S.D. Ind. 2014) (holding state as 
employer suffered injury in fact to its proprietary interests under the ACA because there 
was a risk that some state employees would seek coverage under the act and the state 
would incur costs of $167 per month per employee). 
BRESCIA (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2018 11:51 AM 
420 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96, 363 
compensation threshold for employees who would be exempt from 
overtime rules based on the nature of their work tasks, that is, the rule 
made it harder to claim certain workers were “white collar” and thus 
exempt from overtime rules based on their work activities and their 
salary level.292 The state of Nevada, and twenty other states, sought 
an injunction to prevent these provisions from going into effect.293 
The States’ main argument for standing was that they were employers 
and, as employers, the States would have to pay their employees 
overtime because some portion of their workforce would fall out of 
exemption from the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act.294 While the complaint’s preliminary statement speaks in lofty 
language, highlighting the alleged consequences of the federal 
government’s actions for core federalism principles,295 the actual 
alleged harm to the states is fairly straightforward, and proprietary in 
nature. This juxtaposition of public law aims against private law 
harms underscores the trend, apparent in these state-initiated lawsuits, 
that states are invoking private law harms as a means of achieving 
public law ends. 
The private law nature of the proprietary injuries the plaintiffs are 
alleged to face as a result of the rule is manifest in, for example, the 
state of Nevada’s allegation that it is “subject to the new overtime rule 
because it is an employer that pays a salary less than $913 per week to 
 
292 See Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, 
Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,391 (May 23, 
2016) (to be codified 29 C.F.R. pt. 541). 
293 See Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 218 F.Supp.3d 520 (E.D. Tex. 2016). 
294 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 62–77, Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Labor, 218 F.Supp.3d 520 (E.D. Tex. 2016) (No. 4:16-CV-00731). 
295 The complaint reads as follows: 
The threat to the States’ budgets and, consequently, the system of federalism, is 
palpable. By committing an ever-increasing amount of State funds to paying 
State employee salaries or overtime, the Federal Executive can unilaterally 
deplete State resources, forcing the States to adopt or acquiesce to federal 
policies, instead of implementing State policies and priorities. Without a limiting 
principle (and DOL has recognized none) the Federal Executive could 
deliberately exhaust State budgets simply through the enforcement of the 
overtime rule. But even aside from that possibility, there is no question that the 
new rule, by forcing many State and local governments to shift resources from 
other important priorities to increased payroll for certain employees, will 
effectively impose the Federal Executive’s policy wishes on State and local 
governments. The Constitution is designed to prohibit the Federal Executive’s 
ability to dragoon and, ultimately, reduce the States to mere vassals of federal 
prerogative. 
Id. at 4. 
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certain of its employees working in a bona fide [exempt] capacity.”296 
Similar allegations were made for the other twenty state plaintiffs.297 
The complaint also contained a list of consequences from the DOL 
rule, most of them having to do with the states having to either spend 
more state funds to comply with the provisions or cut back on other 
state services to do so.298 Representative of this allegation is the one 
proffered for Arkansas: 
The state of Arkansas will likely be required to reclassify many 
salaried [exempt] employees as hourly employees and limit those 
employees’ hours to avoid the payment of overtime. Limiting and 
shifting workloads to avoid additional overtime liability is likely to 
result in the reduction of services or delays in the provision of those 
services.299 
The district court in Texas found that the States established standing 
based on these allegations, finding that the States “face imminent 
monetary loss that is traceable to the Department’s Final Rule.”300 
The DOL did not even contest the plaintiffs’ standing. The case is 
now on appeal.301 
D. Challenges to President Obama’s Immigration Actions 
In 2012, the Obama administration announced plans to undertake a 
new approach toward some young undocumented immigrants. Under 
the “Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals” program (DACA), the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would essentially grant a 
temporary legal status to certain undocumented youth.302 In 2014, the 
agency introduced a new initiative, “Deferred Action for Parents of 
Americans” (DAPA), for certain undocumented adults as well.303 
 
296 Id. ¶ 1. 
297 Id. ¶¶ 1–21. 
298 Id. ¶¶ 62–77. 
299 Id. ¶ 68. 
300 Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 218 F.Supp.3d 520, 526 (E.D. Tex. 2016). 
301 Wage and Hour Division, Important Information Regarding Recent Overtime 
Litigation in the U.S. District Court of Eastern District of Texas, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
https://www.dol.gov/whd/overtime/final2016/litigation.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2017). 
302 For an explanation of the DACA program, see Alvin Chang, DACA, the 
Immigration Program Trump Wants to End, Explained in One Simple Cartoon, VOX 
(Sept. 5, 2017, 10:50 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/9/5/16228664 
/daca-explained-one-simple-cartoon. 
303 For a description of the DAPA program, see Frequently Asked Questions: The 
Obama Administration’s DAPA and Expanded DACA Programs, NAT’L IMMIGRATION L. 
CTR. (Mar. 2, 2015), https://www.nilc.org/issues/immigration-reform-and-executive           
-actions/dapa-and-expanded-daca-programs/. 
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Through both programs, once immigrants received coverage under 
them, if they were of a lawful age to drive, they could apply for a 
driver’s license from state authorities if their status made them 
eligible under state law. The state of Texas claimed that DAPA would 
force them to issue driver’s licenses to those eligible for the program 
and joined twenty-five other states in suing to prevent the 
implementation of that program.304 
The lead plaintiff, citing Massachusetts v. EPA, invoked the special 
solicitude afforded the states in the standing inquiry and blended 
traditional economic injury with quasi-sovereign interests in making 
its arguments in favor of standing.305 Evidence presented to the 
district court tended to show that “Texas would lose at least $130.89 
on each license it issues to a DAPA beneficiary,” a figure that was not 
disputed by the federal government.306 The Fifth Circuit found that 
“[i]t is well established that a financial loss generally constitutes an 
injury, so Texas is likely to meet its burden,” of establishing injury in 
fact.307 The federal government contested this argument, saying first, 
that the State would not be compelled to issue any licenses, and 
second, it could offset any cost to the State by raising application 
fees.308 The court found that the State risked an equal protection 
challenge should it deny DAPA eligible applicants drivers’ licenses 
and went on to recognize a “sovereign interest in ‘the power to create 
and enforce a legal code.’”309 The Fifth Circuit invoked language 
from the Supreme Court’s decision in Alfred L. Snapp & Son, in 
which the Supreme Court identified at least two sovereign interests as 
“the exercise of sovereign power over individuals and entities within 
the relevant jurisdiction,” which includes “the power to create and 
enforce a legal code, both civil and criminal” as well as “the demand 
for recognition from other sovereigns” which “most frequently . . . 
involves the maintenance and recognition of borders.”310 
Citing the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. 
Sebelius311 described above, the Fifth Circuit found that “a state has 
 
304 Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 743–45 (5th Cir. 2015). 
305 Id. at 751–52. 
306 Id. at 748. 
307 Id. (footnote omitted). 
308 Id. at 748–49. 
309 Id. at 749 (quoting Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 449 (5th 
Cir. 1999)). 
310 Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982). 
311 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011). 
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standing based on a conflict between federal and state law if ‘the state 
statute at issue regulate[s] behavior or provide[s] for the 
administration of a state program’ . . . but not if ‘it simply purports to 
immunize [state] citizens from federal law.’”312 Recognizing that the 
State’s claim was different in the case before it from the Virginia 
case, the Fifth Circuit found that “Texas’s forced choice between 
incurring costs and changing its laws is an injury because those laws 
exist for the administration of a state program, not to challenge 
federal law, and Texas did not enact them merely to create 
standing.”313 It ultimately characterized the harm in question as a 
“quasi-sovereign interest” which the court described as “not being 
forced to choose between incurring costs and changing its driver’s 
license regime.”314 As a result, the State was “entitled to the same 
‘special solicitude’ as was Massachusetts” in Massachusetts v. 
EPA.315 
Even though President Obama is out of office, these executive 
branch initiatives are still the subject of tension between the federal 
government and the states. On September 5, 2017, the Trump 
administration announced its plans to phase out the DACA program, 
suggesting that Congress should take up the issue and pass legislation 
to address the plight of immigrant youth that would have been eligible 
for the program.316 One of the reasons given for rolling back the 
program was a threat that the administration was going to be sued by 
a collection of conservative states.317 Once the announcement that the 
administration would roll back the program, a group of liberal states 
filed suit for that action.318 The state of New York is the lead plaintiff 
in the suit.319 As is typical of the standing allegations of the different 
 
312 Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 749 (5th Cir. 2015) (alterations in original) 
(quoting Sebelius, 656 F.3d at 269, 270). 
313 Id. 
314 Id. at 752. 
315 Id. The Fifth Circuit went on to find that the federal government caused the harm 
Texas alleged and that relief in the action would redress that harm. Id. at 751–54. 
316 Jordan Fabian, Trump Defends Decision to End DACA, Urges Congress to Act, 
HILL (Sept. 5, 2017, 12:29 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/349222         
-trump-defends-decision-to-end-daca-urges-congress-to-act. 
317 Dara Lind, A Group of Republican Attorneys General Is Picking a Fight with Trump 
on Immigration: Not for the Reasons You Might Think, VOX (June 30, 2017, 9:11 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/6/29/15895458/trump-daca-dreamers-immi 
gration. 
318 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, New York, v. Trump No. 17-
cv-05228 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2017). 
319 Id. 
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states in the complaint, the state of New York alleges harm to its 
proprietary interests, including the loss of financial investment in 
training DACA-eligible employees and educating DACA-eligible 
students enrolled at public universities throughout the state.320 
E. Challenges to President Trump’s Executive Order on Travel from 
Certain Predominantly Muslim Countries 
On January 27, 2017, President Trump issued an Executive Order 
that strictly limited travel from seven predominantly Muslim 
countries.321 In separate actions, the Order was challenged by private 
litigants affected by the travel ban as well as the states of Washington 
and Minnesota together.322 In the States’ actions, the district court 
issued a sweeping temporary restraining order (TRO) halting 
enforcement of the travel ban,323 which was quickly appealed by the 
Department of Justice to the Ninth Circuit.324 After a high-profile oral 
argument on an emergency stay of the district court order, which was 
broadcast live over the internet, the Ninth Circuit panel converted the 
TRO to a preliminary injunction and refused to lift the prohibition on 
the Order’s enforcement.325 In its decision on the stay, and at the 
invitation of the Justice Department, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the 
state of Washington’s standing arguments and found that “the 
Executive Order causes a concrete and particularized injury to [the 
plaintiffs’] public universities, which the parties do not dispute are 
branches of the States under state law.”326 It went on to describe the 
alleged harms as follows: 
 
320 Id. ¶¶ 16–20. 
321 Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017). 
322 Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017). 
323 Temporary Restraining Order, Washington v. Trump, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. 
Wash. Feb. 3, 2017) (No. C17-0141JLR). 
324 Washington v. Trump, 691 F.App’x 834 (9th Cir. 2017). 
325 Trump, 847 F.3d at 1156. 
326 Id. at 1159. The parties submitted supplemental briefs on the standing issue. The 
following is an excerpt from that supplemental brief on the issue, which cited portions of 
the record extensively, although to enhance readability, those references are omitted: 
 Here, the harms to Washington’s proprietary interests are significant and 
wide-ranging.  
 First, Washington will lose significant tax revenue because of the Order. 
Washington receives substantial sales tax revenue every year from travelers from 
the countries impacted by the Order’s travel ban. Washington also stands to lose 
tax revenue from Washington businesses harmed by the Order, as well as revenue 
from legal, non-citizen residents who are being prevented from returning to their 
homes and jobs. Losing these tax revenues is a real, tangible, and immediate 
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[T]the States allege that the teaching and research missions of their 
universities are harmed by the Executive Order’s effect on their 
faculty and students who are nationals of the seven affected 
countries. These students and faculty cannot travel for research, 
academic collaboration, or for personal reasons, and their families 
abroad cannot visit. Some have been stranded outside the country, 
unable to return to the universities at all. The schools cannot 
consider attractive student candidates and cannot hire faculty from 
the seven affected countries, which they have done in the past.327 
The court opinion at this point appears to muddle the question of 
whether it is recognizing these harms as direct harms experienced by 
the universities as arms of the state or whether those universities are 
asserting the third-party interests of their students. On one hand, the 
court recognized that the policy harmed the universities’ educational 
missions and that the state of Washington had experienced financial 
injury because it paid fees to allow foreign interns to travel to the 
country to study.328 The state of Washington “incurred the costs of 
visa applications for those interns and will lose its investment if they 
are not admitted.”329 And the schools “have a mission of ‘global 
 
harm, even putting aside the Order’s longer-term consequences for Washington’s 
economy. 
 Washington also operates several world-class public universities that are 
suffering adverse impacts from the Order. Several hundred faculty, staff, and 
students at state higher education institutions are here on visas from the listed 
countries, while others are long-term permanent residents from the affected 
countries. The order has stranded a member of the WSU faculty overseas, and 
will prevent a member of the UW faculty from serving as the keynote speaker at 
a conference overseas. Both universities have expended significant resources to 
sponsor scholars from the affected countries to perform research and teaching, 
and the Order will prevent several of those individuals from coming to the 
universities or staying there. Students and faculty from the listed countries will 
be prevented from participating in planned travel outside the country to conduct 
research and attend conferences. These harms to faculty, staff, and students 
damage the universities’ missions and reduce their attractiveness to international 
students. 
 In sum, these (and other) direct impacts cement the injury-in-fact required for 
proprietary standing. Far from being speculative, these impacts are occurring 
now. Indeed, the impacts shown here likely understate the State’s proprietary 
harm, as they reflect only what the State has been able to document in three 
business days since the Order was issued. 
Plaintiff State of Wash.’s Supplemental Brief Regarding Standing at 2–3, Washington v. 
Trump, No. 2:17-cv-00141-JLR (W.D. Wash. Feb. 1 2017) (footnotes omitted) (citations 
omitted). 
327 Trump, 847 F.3d at 1159. 
328 Id. at 1159–60. 
329 Id. at 1160. 
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engagement’ and rely on such visiting students, scholars, and faculty 
to advance their educational goals.”330 
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit identified at least some of 
these harms as more in the nature of third-party injuries, advanced by 
the public universities on behalf of their students, citing a series of 
Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedents that permit standing by 
organizations on behalf of their members, as well as by educational 
institutions in the assertion of their students’ rights.331 
Since the Ninth Circuit found these harms to the states as 
conferring standing on them to proceed in the action, it chose not to 
reach the States’ other arguments with respect to standing—namely 
that they could sue in their parens patriae capacity: 
The States have asserted other proprietary interests and also 
presented an alternative standing theory based on their ability to 
advance the interests of their citizens as parens patriae. Because we 
conclude that the States’ proprietary interests as operators of their 
public universities are sufficient to support standing, we need not 
reach those arguments.332 
As this litigation has progressed, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals entertained an effort, initiated by a member of the court, to 
consider rehearing the matter en banc. While the court rejected the 
effort, several judges dissented from the decision not to reconsider the 
case. The dissent by Judge Bea took on the issue of standing to sue 
squarely, recognizing that the States alleged an injury—proprietary in 
 
330 Id. Arguments such as these are consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, in which an association’s harm to its own mission was 
recognized as establishing sufficient injury in fact. The Court found as follows: 
If, as broadly alleged, petitioners’ steering practices have perceptibly impaired 
HOME’s ability to provide counseling and referral services for low-and 
moderate-income homeseekers, there can be no question that the organization has 
suffered injury in fact. Such concrete and demonstrable injury to the 
organization’s activities—with the consequent drain on the organization’s 
resources—constitutes far more than simply a setback to the organization’s 
abstract social interests . . . . We therefore conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, 
that in view of HOME’s allegations of injury it was improper for the District 
Court to dismiss for lack of standing the claims of the organization in its own 
right. 
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982) (footnote omitted) (citation 
omitted). 
331 See Trump, 847 F.3d at 1160 (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 536 
(1925) (standing of educational institution on behalf of its students); Craig v. Boren, 429 
U.S. 190, 195–96 (1976) (standing of vendors seeking to prevent restriction of their 
market)). 
332 Trump, 847 F.3d at 1161 n.5. 
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nature—that would give them standing to sue, even while criticizing 
the three-judge panel’s decision on standing on other grounds.333 
Even as this Article is being written, the litigation to challenge 
President Trump’s immigration policies is evolving. Indeed, the Ninth 
Circuit lawsuit was voluntarily dismissed in light of recent 
developments in the policies at the center of the suit,334 while new 
litigation has commenced to challenge the newest iteration of the 
immigration order.335 Soon after the Trump administration issued its 
second executive order on travel from six predominantly Muslim 
countries.336 The state of Hawai’i filed an action to hold the 
application of this new ban.337 While the state of Hawai’i both 
alleged harms to its proprietary interests and sought to proceed on a 
parens patriae basis, the trial court ruled only on the proprietary 
interests in issuing its order staying application of the travel ban, 
finding standing based on the loss of tuition revenue at the State’s 
public universities and the loss of revenue from tourism from the 
affected countries.338 Finding standing based on these harms alone, 
the trial court found it did not need to reach the question of parens 
patriae standing.339 Upon review in the Ninth Circuit, the court 
affirmed not just the standing of a family member of someone seeking 
to enter the United States, but also that of the state of Hawai’i, 
recognizing the harm to the State’s proprietary interest due to the 
losses it suffered at its universities because of the Order.340 In late 
 
333 Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1185 n.2 (9th Cir. 2017) (denying rehearing 
en banc) (Bea, J., dissenting) (“I agree with the panel that the States have alleged 
proprietary harms to their public universities sufficient to establish Article III standing.”). 
334 See Order of Dismissal, Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 
2017) (No.17-35105). 
335 See Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Hawai’i v. 
Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00050 (D. Haw. Mar. 8, 2017). 
336 Those six countries were Iran, Syria, Libya, Somalia, Yemen, and Sudan. Iraq was 
removed from the original list. In late September, the Trump administration issued a new 
travel ban, restricting travel from these six countries, but also adding certain restrictions 
affecting travel from the following additional countries: North Korea, Chad, and 
Venezuela. Laura Jarrett & Sophie Tatum, Trump Administration Announces New Travel 
Restrictions, CNN (Sept. 25, 2017, 5:15 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/24/politics 
/trump-travel-restrictions/index.html. 
337 Hawai’i v. Trump, 241 F.Supp.3d 1119 (D. Haw. 2017). 
338 Id. at 1128–31. 
339 Id. at 1128. 
340 The Ninth Circuit also acknowledged a secondary argument relating to Hawaii’s 
standing: that it faced harm to its sovereign interests in carrying out its refugee settlement 
policies. Hawai’i v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 762–66 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted and 
consolidated sub nom., Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017). 
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June 2017, the Supreme Court consolidated the cases that had worked 
their way up through both the Ninth and Fourth Circuits, granting the 
Trump administration’s request to assess not just the merits of those 
lower courts’ rulings, but also the standing determination with respect 
to the individual as well as the states.341 
As these cases worked their way through the courts, the approach 
of both the state of Washington and the state of Minnesota, and, now 
the state of Hawai’i before the Supreme Court, to allege a range of 
harms, including so-called private law harms, is consistent with the 
contemporary approach that many state litigants take—emphasizing 
harms experienced by the states themselves, rather than those they 
wish to vindicate through their parens patriae authority.342 
As the preceding discussion shows, state governments made 
strategic decisions with respect to lawsuits against the federal 
government and the harm they alleged in them. From the state of 
Wyoming’s action to attempt to circumvent federal firearms control 
legislation, several states’ attempts to avoid application of aspects of 
the ACA and President Obama’s overtime rules, to various states’ 
efforts to halt the actions of two different U.S. presidents as they 
attempted to undertake actions related to immigration enforcement 
and policy, states are generally choosing not to assert some special 
status as litigants or some special solicitude from the federal courts. 
Rather, states are most successful in establishing standing to sue to 
challenge federal actions and authority where they allege the direct 
harms they suffer, including harms to their proprietary interests.343 As 
such, states are positioning themselves as private litigants, not 
necessarily the public litigants that the types of cases they are 
prosecuting would suggest they represent. Indeed, the more successful 
states—like Texas in the DAPA/DACA case, Oklahoma in the ACA 
case and, to date, the states of Washington, Minnesota, and Hawai’i in 
 
341 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. at 2086. 
342 See, e.g., Hawai’i, 241 F.Supp.3d at 1128–31. As this Article goes to print, the 
Ninth Circuit has issued its most recent decision with respect to the current version of the 
Travel Ban and that decision is being appealed to the Supreme Court. See Hawaii v. 
Trump, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, -- S. Ct. --, 2018 WL 324357 (Jan. 19, 
2018). The question of the state’s standing to sue, which was found sufficient by the Court 
of Appeals based on the state’s quasi-sovereign interests, has not been certified for review 
by the Court. See, id. at 682. 
343 For an argument that states should enjoy parens patriae standing to sue the federal 
government to protect the “continued enforceability” of state law, even against the federal 
government, see Tara Leigh Grove, When Can a State Sue the United States, 101 
CORNELL L. REV. 851, 898 (2016). 
BRESCIA (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2018 11:51 AM 
2018] On Objects and Sovereigns: The Emerging Frontiers of State Standing 429 
the Trump Executive Order litigation—appear to have pursued a 
range of harms in advancing their claims. The cases where courts 
recognized the standing of these states as litigants have been those in 
which the states alleged some direct harm, primarily direct harm to 
some proprietary interest.344 This is consistent with the Court’s view 
of the state of Massachusetts’s arguments in Massachusetts v. EPA, 
where the Court recognized that the State, as a landowner, threatened 
with potential injury to that interest, was likely to enjoy a historically 
privileged status as a litigant, and a very private one at that, despite 
the fact that the suit was about as emblematic of public law litigation 
as there could be.345 
If recent trends hold, states will only feel more empowered to bring 
cases against the federal government, despite Mellon’s limits on the 
right of states to pursue parens patriae actions against the federal 
government, and despite the narrow view of injury in fact espoused 
by the Court in Lujan. Indeed, it would appear that the more states are 
able to characterize the harms they suffer as consistent with that 
traditional class of private harms long recognized by the courts, the 
more likely it is that these very public plaintiffs will be able to 
continue to pursue their claims and play a critical role in policing the 
contours of federalism itself.346 It is to this final issue that I turn next. 
VI 
PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION, STATE STANDING, AND FEDERALISM 
In his work, David and Goliath: Underdogs, Misfits, and the Art of 
Battling Giants, Malcolm Gladwell posits that we often perceive 
asymmetries of power and strength wrong: “Giants are not what we 
think they are,” he says.347 Rather, “[t]he same qualities that appear to 
give them strength are often the sources of great weakness.”348 
 
344 See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 748–52 (2015) (recognizing direct 
financial harm to state of Texas when it might be required to issue new driver’s license to 
otherwise undocumented individuals). 
345 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007). 
346 The notion that states might allege that they suffered harms akin to a private law 
litigant is analogous to the arguments, posed by some, that state governments should enjoy 
free speech rights under the First Amendment, just as a private citizen would. For a 
discussion of state First Amendment rights, see, for example, Ernest A. Young, Welcome 
to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in the Wake of the War on Terror, 69 
BROOK. L. REV. 1277, 1295–1301 (2004). 
347 MALCOLM GLADWELL, DAVID AND GOLIATH: UNDERDOGS, MISFITS, AND THE 
ART OF BATTLING GIANTS 6 (2013). 
348 Id. 
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Whether it is the Biblical David fighting the giant Philistine Goliath, 
Laurence of Arabia using Bedouin cavalry to fight Ottoman tanks and 
machine guns in World War I, or civil rights advocates drawing out 
the ugly violence of local government law enforcement officials, in 
Gladwell’s telling of these stories, the underdogs often have the upper 
hand in the end. They can turn the perceived assets of their 
adversaries into deficits. Bulk and armaments make a fighter less 
mobile. Fixed fortifications are easier to surround. 
We may see these same dynamics play out in the arena of public 
law litigation. Efforts to minimize the effectiveness of public law 
litigation have included giving litigants greater access to the courts to 
those litigants we perceive as best able to characterize their injuries as 
discrete, individualized, private, and personalized—as opposed to 
being more public in nature. State actors have been undaunted by this 
approach, however. They have proceeded to commence very public 
law litigation, while characterizing the harm they have suffered as 
consisting of injuries to their proprietary, almost private, interests—
choosing the prosaic over the poetic and the banal over the inventive 
and inspired. 
It is possible that the Supreme Court’s procedural jurisprudence 
over the last twenty-five years, beginning with Lujan, reveals a 
skepticism for the role of the courts in policing public law disputes. 
Yet, the formalism of contemporary standing jurisprudence appears to 
offer states a role to play in enforcing federal rights, even against the 
federal government and in those cases that are easily classified as 
public law litigation. 
Returning to the notion of standing as self-determination, such self-
determination is meaningless if a party suffering some harm is unable 
to vindicate his or her own rights at all by virtue of a new 
jurisprudence, which makes it more difficult to assert rights through 
the federal courts more generally. If the courthouse doors are closed 
to private parties asserting private rights through new, transubstantive 
procedural barriers to litigation—like more stringent pleading 
requirements, a narrowing of the class action mechanism, or the 
aggressive enforcement of arbitration clauses, for example—so-called 
third-parties are necessary to vindicate important rights when first 
parties are not available, and state litigants are free of some of these 
restrictions. Furthermore, they might have the resources to prepare 
and prosecute cases to overcome other procedural barriers in ways 
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that private litigants cannot.349 Yet the bar to third-party standing 
might otherwise block the way of such litigants. 
By asserting first-party interests, however, states find that they can 
overcome the standing barrier. They advance an interest they may 
share with their “first party” constituents in challenging a particular 
government practice, even when there might be such other litigants 
who may appear to have a greater stake in the litigation. The 
formalism of standing doctrine does not create a hierarchy of injuries 
or interests; however, it does require some cognizable interest to that 
party.350 What this means is that the attack on federal policies can 
emanate from states that have some stake in the outcome, even when 
others might have one that is more significant. 
In this way, instead of bringing actions on behalf of their citizens 
against the federal government, states are beginning to stress that they 
too are the objects of federal actions that might violate federal law or 
the U.S. Constitution. That is, they suffer direct and particularized 
harm of the type that a more traditional litigant might allege. As such, 
these states are invoking traditional “injuries in fact” consistent with 
the formalistic view of harm embraced in current jurisprudence in 
order to satisfy the standing requirement. Indeed, these state litigants 
are alleging harms to their direct interests, like damages they will 
suffer as landowners or the harm to the mission of the educational 
institutions that are arms of the state.351 Instead of finding that the 
formalistic view of standing prohibits their suits, states are embracing 
a formalistic view of their own injuries to establish standing on 
traditional grounds, as objects of the federal government’s actions, as 
opposed to subordinate players in a federal system when there are 
certain federal rights at stake. As a result, the formalistic view of 
standing is actually making state standing to sue more expansive. 
Rather than narrowing the scope of state standing in actions against 
the federal government when the states attempt to assert their parens 
patriae authority—despite the “special solicitude” states are supposed 
to enjoy—states find that coming into court as a common litigant 
 
349 On the “backlash” against private actors vindicating important rights that manifested 
itself in the form of procedural barriers to litigation, see Arthur Miller, Simplified 
Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the 
Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 304–05 (2013). 
350 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734–35 (1972) (requiring a “cognizable” 
interest to the party before the court in order for that party to have standing to bring the 
action). 
351 Hawai’i v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1129–31 (D. Haw. 2017). 
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pleading traditional harms, they establish standing to sue in a manner 
consistent with even the narrowest vision of Article III standing. In 
these ways, they espouse a very public law approach to litigation by 
bringing actions against the federal government to vindicate important 
rights while simultaneously conceptualizing the harms they are 
suffering in very private law terms. They have chosen to rely on 
injuries that are more akin to traditional common law injuries, like 
direct injuries to the states’ own economic interests or their own 
property rights, as opposed to those one might characterize as 
political or philosophical. As a result, states find fertile ground to 
establish standing, stressing these more traditional, private law harms, 
even as they pursue very public law claims. 
Over the same period that courts appeared to narrow the ability of 
litigants to bring public law litigation, a parallel debate has emerged 
regarding the relationship between the states and the federal 
government—perceiving the relationship as sometimes antagonistic 
and sometimes cooperative. At all times, though, it would appear that 
this relationship is partisan. The fact that states—different states with 
different political perspectives—utilize the courts to challenge the 
actions of the executive branch, depending on which party is in 
power, only emphasizes the partisan and public law nature of these 
actions. This sort of “partisan federalism,” as it has been described, 
“involves political actors’ use of state and federal governments in 
ways that articulate, stage, and amplify competition between the 
political parties, and the affective individual processes of state and 
national identification that accompany this dynamic.”352 As a result, 
litigation in the courts, pursued by states seeking to vindicate 
sweeping constitutional claims—but alleging formal, almost trivial 
harms—has become, to borrow the Prussian military strategist 
Clausewitz’s take on war—“politics by other means.”353 
 
352 Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1080 (2014). 
353 CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 87 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds. & trans., 
Princeton Univ. Press 1984) (1832). While this martial analogy may not seem apt, 
remember the words of the Supreme Court in some of the early parens patriae cases, where 
the Court acknowledged that litigation between the states was a by-product of their 
surrender of a degree of their sovereignty to join the union of states that formed the United 
States, and the right to sue, at least each other and other citizens, was offered as a 
substitute for resolving disputes between the states on the battlefield. Georgia v. Pa. R.R. 
Co., 324 U.S. 439, 450 (1945) (“The traditional methods available to a sovereign for the 
settlement of such disputes were diplomacy and war. Suit in this Court was provided as an 
alternative.”). 
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The nineteenth-century French aristocrat Alexis de Tocqueville 
wrote that “[t]here is almost no political question in the United States 
that is not resolved sooner or later into a judicial question.”354 States 
are pursuing the resolution of political disputes in the federal courts 
and are simultaneously helping to shape federalism. Debates about the 
value and purposes of “Our Federalism”355 highlight the role that the 
states play in the federal system. Debates are places where states can 
experiment with policy and can cooperate with the federal 
government in shaping and carrying out national policies on a state 
level. But, the framers of the Constitution also had another role in 
mind for the states, which states fulfill as they bring litigation to 
pursue politics by other means. The states are positioning themselves 
as protectors of liberty and defenders of the Constitution. Whether it 
is so-called “red” states fighting implementation of the Obama 
administration’s signature social program, the ACA, or “blue” states 
challenging President Trump’s immigration policies. Such 
phenomena appropriately spur debates about the proper role of the 
states in defending federal rights in the federal system, and these 
debates possess a greater salience as the courts have become arenas 
for such partisan politics to play out. 
Writing for the majority of the Court in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 
Justice O’Connor described some of the “advantages” of 
federalism.356 The federal government and the states serve as “joint 
sovereigns,” which includes “assur[ing] a decentralized government 
that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous 
society[,] . . . increase[ing] opportunity for citizen involvement in 
democratic processes[,] . . . allow[ing] for more innovation and 
experimentation in government[,] and . . . mak[ing] government more 
responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile 
citizenry.”357 
But, Justice O’Connor stressed that the “principal benefit of the 
federalist system” is it serves as a “check on abuses of government 
power.”358 Her majority opinion would add 
 
354 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 257 (Harvey C. Mansfield 
& Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., 2000). 
355 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). 
356 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991). 
357 Id. As Heather Gerken explained, “Federalism is thought to promote choice, 
competition, experimentation, and the diffusion of power.” Heather K. Gerken, Our 
Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1552 (2012). 
358 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458. 
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Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches 
of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of 
excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power 
between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk 
of tyranny and abuse from either front.359 
O’Connor cited the following passage from Madison’s Federalist 
51, which highlights the “double security” the citizenry enjoys from 
this joint sovereignty: 
In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is 
submitted to the administration of a single government; and the 
usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government 
into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of 
America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided 
between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to 
each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a 
double security arises to the rights of the people. The different 
governments will control each other, at the same time that each will 
be controlled by itself.360 
Erwin Chemerinsky elaborated on the values federalism is 
supposed to promote, including enhancing liberty, “effectively 
meeting society’s needs,” efficiency, civic participation, community 
empowerment, and “economic gains.”361 The concept of “federalism 
as empowerment” is the notion that having multiple levels of 
government can afford greater civil protection. Therefore, “[i]f one 
level of government fails to require cleanup of nuclear wastes or to 
protect women from violence, another can step in.”362 Thus, having 
many levels of government means “there are multiple power centers 
capable of act[ion].”363 Federal and state courts should both “be 
available to protect constitutional rights.”364 The legislatures at all 
levels of government should also “have the authority to deal with 
social problems, such as unsafe nuclear wastes, guns near schools, 
and criminals owning firearms.”365 
 
359 Id.; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997) (division of powers 
between federal government and the states designed to ensure protection of liberty); 
Andrzej Rapacynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After 
Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341, 380 (1985) (citing the freedom from government 
“tyranny” as “perhaps the most frequently mentioned function” of federalism). 
360 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 459 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison)). 
361 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assumptions of Federalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1763, 1790 
(2006). 
362 Id. at 1766. 
363 Id. at 1766–67. 
364 Id. at 1767. 
365 Id. 
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This vision of courts and legislatures preserving and protecting 
rights and liberties leaves out the critical role that dueling federal and 
state executive branches play in the ongoing debate over the proper 
scope and contours of federal and public law litigation. State 
attorneys general and governors have been the primary actors fencing 
with the federal government in the courts, regardless of the political 
party in the White House. Some would prefer not to see such disputes 
resolved in the courts in this way.366 As Rick Hills argued, however, 
restrictive views of federalism, where political safeguards are enough 
to police the boundaries of federal and state power, are “not really 
theories of federalism at all but theories of judicial review . . . .”367 It 
is in the courts where the checks and balances of federalism 
ultimately play out in many respects. As Ernest Young explains, “it 
may be that the vitality of political and institutional checks ultimately 
depends on the enforcement of certain substantive constraints on 
federal power.”368 And, in many instances, the locus of enforcement 
of those constraints, it turns out, is going to be the courts in many 
instances, meaning public law litigation will be the vehicle for such 
disputes. 
That is not to say that state challenges to federal government 
actions are the ideal vehicle for a rich dialogue over the legality of 
government behavior. The stories that states tell are very different 
from those of individual plaintiffs. Compare the alleged injuries of the 
states of Hawai’i, Washington, Minnesota, i.e., that their universities’ 
students will not be able to travel and their universities’ educational 
 
366 See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL 
PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 
180–84 (1980); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of 
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards 
of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National 
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). For critiques of that strain of federalism that 
looks to the political processes, and not the courts, to police the contours of federalism 
itself, see Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of 
Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75 (2001), and Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The 
Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459 
(2001). 
367 Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why 
State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 
821 (1998). 
368 Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1368 
(2001). He continues, “although scholarly wars over constitutional interpretation in the 
past several decades have yielded other rationales for judicial review in other contexts, 
enforcement of the basic political rules of the road remains one of the most persuasive 
justifications for the institution.” Id. at 1373. 
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missions will be harmed, to those of an individual stopped at a U.S. 
airport who risked his life serving as an interpreter in Iraq for U.S. 
ground troops.369 Which is more salient, which calls out for judicial 
intervention, and which places the alleged illegal activity in higher 
relief? 
Furthermore, in its 1962 decision, Baker v. Carr, the Supreme 
Court highlighted one of the justifications for standing doctrine as 
follows: 
A federal court cannot “pronounce any statute, either of a state or of 
the United States, void, because irreconcilable with the constitution, 
except as it is called upon to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in 
actual controversies.” Have the appellants alleged such a personal 
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete 
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which 
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult 
constitutional questions? This is the gist of the question of standing. 
It is, of course, a question of federal law.370 
Does the reliance of state litigants on so-called “makeweight,” 
proprietary harms run contrary to this requirement? In other words, 
does asking state litigants to allege proprietary harms distract courts 
from addressing other, core harms—like harms to parens patriae 
interests, an imbalance in power between the federal and state 
governments, or constitutional injuries—that might justify greater 
attention from the courts? Standing doctrine does not only ask that 
plaintiffs allege a concrete, traditional injury to their own interests 
but, also that those plaintiffs bring injuries to the courts that present 
“concrete adverseness.”371 Such adverseness in constitutional 
disputes is often less a product of plaintiffs articulating common law-
type injuries and more likely a result of their identifying issues that 
raise important constitutional questions. Moreover, there are often 
parties aligned on all sides of those issues with strong stakes in the 
outcome. This is typically the case regardless of whether such stakes 
resemble the type of injury for which an action existed in common 
law at the birth of the republic. 
Similarly, given the harms that states allege, would the remedies 
states seek in order to rectify those harms present themselves as 
trivial, like Justice Blackmun’s critique of the majority holding in 
 
369 Nicholas Kulish, Iraqi Immigrant, Caught in a Trump Policy Tangle, is Allowed to 
Stay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2017, at A18. 
370 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (citation omitted). 
371 Id. 
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Lujan? That is, when a state brings a legal broadside against a wide-
ranging federal program, yet articulates an injury that appears as 
inconsequential compared to the challenged constitutional violation, 
are the remedies available to the courts in such situations up to the 
task of addressing those constitutional violations that might lie at the 
heart of the dispute? Can a court address such constitutional 
violations when they appear, at times, in cases where the injury 
alleged is one that is common in a dispute between neighbors, or 
typically resolved on “Judge Judy”? Unfortunately, the limitations 
imposed upon public law litigation, developed over the years, may 
leave states little room to allege more meaningful injuries. Therefore, 
perceived harms to proprietary interests are the means by which the 
states can challenge federal government practices in the courts. Thus, 
we are left with litigation that is less than what it could be. But we 
should not let a demand for the perfect prevent adjudication of the 
good. Without these states taking action, some of the federal practices 
that are alleged to violate statutory and constitutional law may have 
never been challenged in the courts.372 
Federal courts should remain open for the vindication of federal 
rights. Limiting state standing, or any litigant’s standing to cases in 
which that litigant is able to allege some form of traditional, common 
law harm runs the risk of distorting the public law litigation process to 
focus it on those harms that are likely not the most serious of the 
those generated by the defendant’s challenged conduct. If concrete 
adverseness means anything, it should be that what is really at stake 
in a dispute is what a court should seek to adjudicate, not some 
ancillary or satellite issue. However, given the current state of 
standing doctrine, to vindicate a right through the courts, a litigant is 
forced to offer allegations that describe the harm he or she faces in 
ways that are more likely to overcome standing doctrine. That litigant 
must allege an injury in fact to traditional interests. State litigants 
appear able to present their injuries as those that are consistent with 
this approach to standing, use the courts as platforms on which to 
challenge federal government action, and serve as a counterweight to 
federal power. 
 
372 This fear is similar to the fear that the tendency toward more private—as a opposed 
to public—adjudication, through Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and private 
arbitration, limits the role of the judiciary and prevents public adjudication of disputes. On 
the value of public, as opposed to private, adjudication see, for example, Judith Resnik, 
The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration of The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793, 1836–38 (2014). 
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However, the risks remain that a narrow approach to the harms 
plaintiffs seek to vindicate may ultimately limit the power of the 
courts to adjudicate those rights under robust conditions that allow for 
a full and fair hearing of the underlying rights and constitutional 
issues. And yet, it is the very creation of such an appropriate forum 
for the adjudication of rights that is one of the goals of standing 
doctrine in the first place. 
Another shortcoming of this private law approach to standing in 
the public law arena is that there is a risk that a focus on a narrow 
class of harms might hamstring the courts in the range of potential 
remedies that they might have at their disposal due to the need to 
match those remedies to the specific harms alleged. In other words, 
courts cannot issue sweeping orders to rectify constitutional injuries if 
they have not been asked to rectify such injuries by the parties before 
them. What if, in response to the state of Texas’s claims that it faced 
the loss of $130 for each DAPA recipient who filed for a driver’s 
license (with no indication that any particular DAPA recipient had 
actually sought to do so), the court simply ordered the federal 
government to reimburse Texas for each recipient who sought a 
license? What if, in the travel ban litigation, the federal government is 
simply ordered to allow any student of the University of Hawai’i who 
might otherwise be subject to the ban to enter the state and enroll in 
classes while leaving the order intact? Regardless of one’s political 
affiliation, such limited remedies, which might naturally flow from 
the harms alleged by these states in these different contexts, would 
clearly leave much to be desired. 
Nevertheless, the latticework of federalism—which creates both 
horizontal and vertical divisions within and among the federal and 
state governments—creates room for tensions and oppositional forces 
to engage in a constant dialogue and struggle across these divisions. 
Further, it allows a discourse on the liberty of the citizens framed by 
the backdrop of constitutional protections across federalism’s 
platform. Put another way, federalism itself provides a “durable and 
robust scaffolding for partisan conflict.”373 If the last decade of state-
initiated lawsuits against the federal government is any guide, the 
foundation of that platform appears to be the courts, through public 
law litigation commenced by states against the federal government. 
Although courts have sought to restrain the ability of litigants to 
pursue public law claims through doctrines such as standing, states 
 
373 Bulman-Pozen, supra note 352, at 1081. 
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appear to have found a way to bring very public law claims, even 
against the federal government. In order to do so, states have alleged 
private law harms while pursuing public law ends. Narrowed 
procedural doctrines have not just failed to prevent such litigation; 
they have shown the path forward for such disputes to proceed in the 
courts. By doing so, they have opened up a new battleground along 
federalism’s frontier. 
CONCLUSION 
Justice Brandeis famously called the states laboratories of 
democracy.374 But practically a century and a half before Brandeis, in 
Federalist 28, Alexander Hamilton envisioned a very different role 
for the states: 
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general 
government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of 
the state governments, and these will have the same disposition 
towards the general government. The people, by throwing 
themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. If 
their rights are invaded by either, they can make the use of the other 
as the instrument of redress.375 
By taking positions at time adverse to the federal government in 
the courts through public law litigation, regardless of the 
administration or political party in power, states can serve as political 
and constitutional counterweights when they perceive that the federal 
government is threatening their interests and those of their 
constituents. They do this by bringing very public law litigation and 
making sweeping allegations of unconstitutional behavior of the 
federal government. States appear able to pursue such claims through 
the federal courts, even when the courts have expressed a reluctance 
to recognize state authority to sue in a representational capacity and 
when standing doctrine more generally appears less willing to 
recognize public harms. By characterizing the harms they allege as 
those that resemble what a private litigant might assert, however, 
states appear to have found an approach to vindicating public law 
interests dressed down in the raiment of private law harms. By doing 
so, their claims appear to have faced courts more receptive to such 
harms and more willing to entertaining such suits. Whether this 
 
374 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(stating that “a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; 
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country”). 
375 THE FEDERALIST NO. 28 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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approach generates the type of concrete adverseness the standing 
doctrine is supposed to surface and brings to light the true nature of 
the harms at stake that deserve attention by the courts, remains to be 
seen. 
 
